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Amending the Foreign Sovereign





Foreign sovereign immunity is the principle of international law under which
foreign states are deemed not amenable to the jurisdiction of domestic courts.l
Determining in which cases this waiver of jurisdiction is appropriate has long
been an area of controversy in international law.2 This determination is becoming
increasingly difficult as the commercial and political contacts between states with
differing views of the government's role grow.3
With the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA, 1976 Act, or Act),
the United States became the first country to attempt to codify the rules of foreign
sovereign immunity.4 The 1976 Act extends immunity from legal action to for-
eign states and their agencies or instrumentalities,5 subject to various exceptions
and qualifications.6 It also establishes a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme for
actions involving foreign states.7 The Act has been in effect for more than ten
* Member of the class of 1988, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Recent Developments, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 191, 191 (1979) [hereinafter Recent Develop-
ments]; McCormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act
of State Doctrine, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 477, 478 (1984); 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 913 (1965); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § l15a (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1952).
See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6606 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
2. Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 191.
3. McCormick, supra note 1, at 477.
4. See Feldman, The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Perspective: A
Founder's View, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 302, 303 (1986).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1604 (1982).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982).
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604-1607 (1982).
160 NOTES
years8 and Congress is considering amendments to enhance its operation.9 These
amendments, however, fail to correct the Act's greatest deficiency: its inadequacy
in cases involving non-market economies.'0
The Act fails to account for the ideological differences between capitalist
nations and socialist or communist nations." Capitalist nations are usually asso-
ciated with a relatively free market economy where private ownership and an
emphasis on individual rights are the norm.'2 In contrast, socialist states are
associated with a planned economy where the major means of production are
usually nationalized and individual property and contract rights are secondary to
the interests of the national community.3 These ideological distinctions are fun-
damental to any legal transaction because they surround and give meaning to the
legal terms of a transaction.1' They must not be overlooked in formulating the
standards of foreign sovereign immunity.15
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate the need for an amendment o the
1976 Act, in addition to those presently under consideration, which recognizes the
political and economic realities of the modem world. The following discussion
focuses on the FSIA and its inability to accommodate the ideology of non-market
economies in making immunity determinations. After examining the FSIA and the
development of foreign sovereign immunity in general, the discussion turns to an
analysis of the differences between capitalist, or free market societies, and so-
8. The FSIA was enacted on October 21, 1976 and it became effective on January 19, 1977. von
Mebren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 33 n. 1
(1978).
9. The amendments, proposed by Senator Charles McC. Mathias (R., Md.), deal with the effect of
arbitration agreements on sovereign immunity, limitations on the defense of act of state in expropria-
tion and breach of contract cases, prejudgment attachments of foreign governmental agency property,
execution of judgments on commercial property of foreign governments and their agencies, admiralty
claims against foreign governmental shipping, and treatment of governmental loan transactions as
commercial activity not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Act. See S. 1071, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S5363 (daily ed. May 3, 1985). For a discussion of the proposed amendments,
see Atkeson & Ramsey, Proposed Amendment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 770 (1985).
10. See generally S. 1071, supra note 9; Atkeson & Ramsey, supra note 9; infra text accompanying
notes 11-15. The problems posed by the 1976 Act's standards for immunity are more fully developed
infra in Sections IV and V of this Note.
I1. Note, Breaking Out of the Capitalist Paradigm: The Significance of Ideology in Determining
the Sovereign Immunity of Soviet and Eastern-Bloc Commercial Entities, 2 Hous. J. INT'L L. 425,
426 (1980) [hereinafter Capitalist Paradigm]. See also Recent Developments, supra note 1, at
199-205; Recent Developments, Foreign Sovereign Immunity-Communist and Socialist Organiza-
tions-Effect of State's System of Property Ownership on Determination ofAgency or Instrumentality
Status Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 9 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. iI1, 121-22
(1979) [hereinafter Property Ownership].
12. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note II, at 426.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 425.
15. Id.
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cialist/communist, or non-market systems. Sections IV and V analyze two areas
where the failure of the Act is especially pronounced-the definition of an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" and the commercial activity excep-
tion to foreign sovereign immunity. Each section includes a proposal that would
improve the operation of the FSIA with respect to non-market economies without
sacrificing its performance in the case of free market systems.
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197616 represents Congress' attempt
to standardize the law governing sovereign immunity by providing federal and
state courts with a comprehensive framework to resolve all issues of foreign
sovereign immunity. 17 The Act codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity, 8 which the United States adopted in 1952.11 Nearly all major states substan-
16. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)). The structure of the FSIA's major sections in Title 28 of the
United States Code is as follows:
§ 1330: Actions against foreign states (jurisdiction)
§ 1602: Findings and declaration of purpose
§ 1603: Definitions
§ 1604: Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
§ 1605: General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
§ 1606: Extent of liability
§ 1607: Counterclaims
§ 1608: Service; time to answer; default
§ 1609: Immunity from attachment and execution of property of a foreign state
§ 1610: Exceptions to the immunity from attachment and execution
§ 1611: Certain types of property immune from execution
[hereinafter reference to the FSIA will be to the 1982 Edition of 28 U.S.C.]
17. HOUSE REPORT at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at
6610 (The FSIA sets forth the "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of
sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United States.").
18. HousE REPORT at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at
6605. According to the restrictive view of foreign sovereign immunity, a municipal court may
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign regarding matters arising from the foreign sovereign's
private acts (jure gestionis), but not in matters stemming from its public acts (jure imperii). McCor-
mick, supra note 1, at 480; Singer, Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms
of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1985).
The alternative to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity. Under this view of immunity, without its consent a state cannot be sued in the courts of
another state for any reason. Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity,
50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 168 (1981). This view of immunity stems from the belief that the exercise
of jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign insults the independence, equality, and dignity of that sov-
ereign. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). United States
courts adhered to the absolute theory of foreign sovereign immunity, refusing to adjudicate any
claims between United States citizens and foreign governments, until 1952. Feldman, supra note 4, at
303; Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976-Judicial Predominance, 4 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 146, 147-48 (1977). See infra note 19.
19. The United States adopted the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity in 1952 with the
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tially engaged in international trade have now abandoned the absolute theory of
foreign sovereign immunity in favor of the restrictive view. 20 Only socialist
states, such as the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, still officially
contend that, in theory, international law requires that foreign sovereigns be
accorded absolute immunity from judicial process in foreign states.2' In practice,
however, even these states appear to recognize the actuality of restrictive soy-
State Department's issuance of the Tate Letter. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, to the Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. This decision was prompted by explosive growth in
international trade and the emergence of governmental trading agencies in the Eastern bloc, both of
which resulted in a tremendous increase in commercial contacts between states and the private
citizens of other nations. McCormick, supra note I, at 483-84. See also Tate Letter, supra, at 985;
Hill, supra note 18, at 171; Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARV. Ir'L L.J. 429, 432 (1977) [hereinafter Judicial Con-
trol]. With the increasing commercial contacts between private parties and foreign governments, the
State Department felt that despite the importance of international trade, considerations of fairness to
persons doing business with foreign governments required that such persons be able to have their
rights determined in court. Tate Letter, supra, at 985. See also Singer, supra note 18, at 9; Kahale &
Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States,
18 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 212 (1979). In adopting the restrictive view of immunity, the
United States fell in line with most Western European nations. These states had already perceived that
the justifications for granting immunity become inapplicable when a sovereign departs from its
political and governmental roles and enters into the commercial, industrial, and similar spheres.
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
220, 220 (1951); Singer, supra note 18, at 1.
20. Singer, supra note 18, at 6. England became the last major international trader to adopt the
restrictive view of immunity with the State Immunity Act of 1978. Id. at 4. See also McCormick,
supra note 1, at 483-84; Hill, supra note 18, at 171; Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 432-33.
The trend toward restricted immunity was described as follows:
[Tihe swing toward the more radical doctrine of holding states responsible to the courts for
their economic activities was given a great impetus by the appearance on the international
stage of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Courts . . . saw beneath the garments of the
sovereign a powerful economic competitor of national business firms, which should not be
allowed to handicap private enterprise by the claim of sovereign prerogative.
E. ALLEN, THE POSIT[ON OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 301-02 (1933).
21. Singer, supra note 18, at 6; Jurisdiction of United States Courts in Suits against Foreign States:
Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings] (Testi-
mony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, US Department of State).
The Soviet Union rejects the theory of restrictive immunity because it believes that a distinction
cannot be made between acts of a socialist state that are of a public nature and acts that are of a private
or commercial nature. Osakwe, A Soviet Perspective on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Law and
Practice, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 13, 14 (1982). Under prevailing Soviet political theory concerning the
nature of the state, an act of a socialist state does not cease to be sovereign merely because the state is
performing functions that are traditionally reserved to private persons in non-socialist legal systems.
Id. The Soviets argue that in a capitalist system, the state has voluntarily agreed to share some of its
powers with private interests while at the same time abdicating some of its functions entirely to private
persons. The socialist state, on the other hand, has not agreed to share any powers with private
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ereign immunity.22 The restrictive theory is thus firmly implanted as the standard
for immunity under international law,23 and is appropriately adopted by the
FSIA.
In addition to formalizing the law of restrictive foreign sovereign immunity,
the Act seeks to make the application of that law more uniform, fair, and hence
predictable, by transferring the authority to make immunity determinations from
the executive to the judiciary.24 Prior to the FSIA the State Department, rather
than the courts, was the dominant force in immunity determinations .25 Foreign
parties. Id. at 22. In the Soviet view, such abdication of functions or sharing of powers with private
persons is impossible in the socialist state, because the personality of the socialist state is indivisible.
All activities, political as well as economic, are endowed with the same degree of sovereignty. Id.; see
also Boguslavsky, Foreign State Immunity: Soviet Doctrine and Practice, 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L.
167, 169-70 (1979).
China's adherence to the principle of absolute foreign sovereign immunity is based, in part, on
reasons similar to those advanced by the Soviet Union. See Comment, China's Stance on Sovereign
Immunity: A Critical Perspective on Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 22 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 101, 121-22 (1983) [hereinafter China's Stance]. It is also a product of China's adverse
experience with extraterritorial laws of Western powers and China's extension to foreign states of
absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of Chinese courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1494 (l1th Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States' statement of interest). See also China's Stance, supra, at 119-20. In addition, the
Chinese have a traditional distaste for litigation as a means of dispute settlement. They much prefer
arbitration to adversary judicial proceedings. China's Stance, supra, at 120-21.
For a general discussion of the reasons behind China's position on sovereign immunity, see China's
Stance, supra, at 119-22; Recent Developments, Government Shipping Company of the People's
Republic of China is an 'Agency or Instrumentality" for the Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 637, 650 n.67 (1981).
22. The Soviet Union commonly enters into bilateral treaties in which it consents to subject its
state trading enterprises to the jurisdiction of municipal courts in disputes arising out of their
commercial activities. Singer, supra note 18, at 6-7; 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 56 (testimony
of Monroe Leigh). This treaty practice is best viewed as an ideological rather than a merely pragmatic
acceptance of the restrictive doctrine. Singer, supra note 18, at 6. See, e.g., Claim Against the Empire
of Iran Case, Apr. 30 1963, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 16 BVerfG 27, 54-55 (1962)',
reprinted in 45 I.L.R. 57, 75 (1972).
Like the U.S.S.R., the PRC and its organizations have begun to enter into commercial agreements
containing sovereign immunity waivers. See China's Stance, supra note 21, at 125. The PRC's
willingness to recognize a restrictive interpretation of sovereign immunity is corroborated by the
increasing willingness of Chinese entities to appear as parties before United States courts. Id. at
125-29. In fact, the PRC itself recently entered a special appearance for the limited puipose of
asserting its sovereign immunity in the Hunguang Railway Bonds case. Jackson v. People's Republic
of China, 794 E2d at 1492, 1494. Although the PRC argued absolute immunity, id. at 1494, the very
fact that it appeared at all indicates a willingness to relax its absolute perspective. See China's Stance,
supra note 21, at 125-29; Singer, supra note 18, at 6-7. It thus appears that little remains of the
doctrine of absolute immunity in the actual practice of socialist states. Singer, supra note 18, at 7.
23. Singer, supra note 18, at 7.
24. House REPORT at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 1, at
6605-06.
25. See Feldman, supra note 4, at 303-04; Hill, supra note 18, at 174-76; Judicial Control, supra
note 19, at 435-36; McCormick, supra note 1, at 484-85; von Mehren, supra note 8, at 41.
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states could submit claims of immunity to the courts through the State Depart-
ment.26 Because the judiciary deferred to State Department immunity determina-
tions,27 foreign states often placed diplomatic pressure on the Department to
allow immunity for foreign policy reasons in cases where it was not available
under the restrictive theory.2" The FSIA terminated the dominant role of the State
Department in the area of sovereign immunity to reduce the political pressures
brought to bear upon the Department in its consideration of immunity pleas and
to assure private litigants that immunity determinations would be made on purely
legal grounds.2 9
26. Hill, supra note 18, at 174-75; Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 435; Feldman, supra note 4,
at 303.
27. The doctrine of judicial deference to executive determinations of sovereign immunity was the
product of a series of Supreme Court cases culminating in Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943), and
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). In Peru, the Court indicated that the executive
had a constitutionally mandated prerogative of action in the field of foreign relations, 318 U.S. at 588.
Because of the implications to United States foreign relations, wrongs to foreign nations were better
righted through diplomatic negotiation than through the courts. It thus concluded that the executive's
determination as to sovereign immunity "must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determina-
tion by the political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the vessel interferes with
the proper conduct of our foreign relations." Id. at 589. In Hoffman, the Court more explicitly
enunciated a political question restriction on the courts' jurisdiction. It further noted that courts
should not embarrass the executive by reviewing its immunity determinations. 324 U.S."at 35-36.
Together these two cases came to stand for the proposition that a United States court must dismiss a
cause of action against a sovereign state upon the interposition of a sovereign immunity plea by the
State Department. See von Mehren, supra note 8, at 40, 41; Hill, supra note t8, at 174; Judicial
Control, supra note 19, at 431-32; Feldman, supra note 4, at 303-04.
28. Feldman, supra note 4, at 304. Immunity pleas directed to the State Department were analyzed
without established procedures for taking evidence, applying precedent, justifying determinations, or
affording the opportunity for appeal. Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 435-36; Hill, supra note 18,
at 175. See generally Note, Proposed Draft Legislation on the Sovereign Immunity of Foreign
Governments: An Attempt to Revest the Courts With a Judicial Function, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 302,
311-22 (1974). There were, in fact, inconsistencies in the Department's application of the restrictive
theory and instances where political considerations blatantly overrode the dictates of the Tate Letter.
Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 216; Jackson v. People's Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1493
(1 th Cir. 1986). See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggestion of immunity from suit
in commercial case); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971)
(suggestion of immunity from suit in commercial case involving a waiver of immunity), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 985 (1971); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (suggestion of
immunity from attachment of commercial vessel notwithstanding a waiver of immunity). See also
Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day in Court, 46
FORDHAM L. REv. 543, 547-49 (1977) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Day]. This fueled the arguments of
those who favored a depoliticization of the decision-making process in order to protect the interests of
private individuals. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 216; Hill, supra note 18, at 175.
29. See HousE REPORT at 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note
1, at 6605-06. Although one of Congress' primary objectives in passing the 1976 Act was to
depoliticize immunity determinations by transferring them from the State Department to the judici-
ary, the Act does not guarantee this result. Rather, it remains to the judges applying the Act to
depoliticize it. Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 454. The Act merely states that claims of immunity
are to be decided by United States courts in conformity with the FSIA; it does not prevent the courts
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Under the Act, a foreign state, or agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,30
is immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts3' unless the plaintiff can
show that the defendant's act falls under one of the expressly enumerated excep-
tions to foreign sovereign immunity.32 The exceptions to the general rule of
immunity include waiver of immunity, commercial activities, expropriation
claims, and most non-commercial torts.33 Because the FSIA codifies the re-
strictive theory of sovereign immunity, the most important of these exceptions
relates to commercial activities.3 4 The commercial activities exception to sov-
from taking into account views communicated to them by the executive. Smit, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976: A Plea For Drastic Surgery, 74 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 49, 61 n.63
(1980). The State Department has indicated that it will not hesitate to express its views as amicus
curiae on issues arising under the Act. See Letter from the Legal Advisor of the State Department to
the Attorney General (Nov. 2, 1976), reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 50883, 50883-884 (1976).
In this regard, it is interesting to note that in the Novosti Press Agency case the State Department
responded to a request for diplomatic assistance by stating that it "concurs with the position taken by
the attorneys for Novosti" regarding the retroactivity of the Act's application, and the court referred to
and substantially accepted this statement. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp.
849, 851 n. I (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Department, however, did decline to render an opinion on the
merits of the claim to immunity. Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 206 (1979).
The judiciary must be careful not to allow State Department suggestions to control the courts'
immunity determinations. Were it otherwise, the courts would once again be deferring to the State
Department, which would be subject to the very foreign policy considerations that the 1976 Act
sought to eliminate. Indeed, the House Report indicates that the judiciary should not defer to the
executive branch regardless of how the executive presses its views on the court. See HOUSE REPORT at
12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6610.
30. A foreign state, its agency or its instrumentality is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) and (b). This
definition is set out infra at notes 147-50 and accompanying text. An analysis of the problems with
the Act's definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is presented infra in Section
IV of this Note.
31. Jurisdiction is obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), which provides:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in § 1603(a) of this title as to any
claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
either under §§ 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
28 U.S.C. § 1604 recognizes a general rule of immunity for a foreign state acting under its own name
or through an instrumentality or government-owned entity.
32. Exceptions are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Under the 1976 Act, sovereign immunity is an
affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded. The defendant bears the burden of producing
evidence in support of its claim of immunity, If it establishes that it is a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state, it is presumed to be immune. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff
to show that the defendant's acts fall under one of the statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity. See
HousE REPORT at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6616.
For a discussion of the procedural complexities involved in raising and proving sovereign immunity,
see Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 412-24 (1982).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
34. HOUSE REPORT at 18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note I, at
6617; Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 198.
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ereign immunity dictates that a foreign sovereign is not immune in cases arising
out of "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act." 35 Thus, the distinction between public and commercial ac-
tivities is vital.
Although the United States formally adopted the restrictive view of foreign
sovereign immunity in 1952, confusion over the appropriate means to distinguish
between a state's public and commercial acts remained until the passage of the
FSIA.3 6 Prior to the Act, courts and commentators formulated a variety of tests to
differentiate between public and private acts.37 Some focused on the nature of the
act, classifying as sovereign those acts that could be performed only by the
sovereign;38 others adopted a "purpose" approach, considering sovereign those
acts performed for a public purpose.39 As can easily be imagined, this led to
confusion and inconsistent results.4°
The "commercial activity exception" is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) which states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose."
36. Feldman, supra note 4, at 303-04. See also Hill, supra note 18, at 175-76; McCormick, supra
note 1, at 484-85; Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 435; von Mehren, supra note 8, at 41. Foreign
states had the option of deciding which immunity determinations they would submit directly to the
courts and which they would submit through the State Department. With two different branches of the
government involved the governing standards were neither clear nor uniform. Hill, supra note 18, at
174-75; Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 435; Feldman, supra note 4, at 303.
37. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 212.
38. Id. at 212-13. See also Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 204 N.Y.S.2d 971, 25
Misc. 2d 299 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 233 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 17 A.D.2d 927 (App. Div. 1962); Weiss,
Competence ou Incompetence des Trigunaux a 'Egard des Etats Etrangers, I RECEUIL DES COURS
DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 521 (1923).
39. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 213. See, e.g., Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
250 E 341 (2d Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918); In re Investigation of World Arrange-
ments, 13 ER.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
40. After the Tate Letter of 1952, courts in the United States began taking different and sometimes
inconsistent approaches to immunity determinations. In Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece,
Ministery of Commerce, Purchase Directorate, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
394 (1966), Greece's Ministry of Commerce claimed immunity from suit on a contract for purchases
and shipments of grain, but immunity was denied. But in Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of
India, 446 E2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), the court upheld sovereign
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In Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General,4' the Second Circuit rejected
both the "nature" and the "purpose" tests as "unsatisfactory" and "unworka-
ble"42 and created its own classification of political and public acts.43 It then
declared that foreign states would be entitled to immunity only from claims
arising out of those activities.44 These immune governmental activities were
comprised of:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and
(5) public loans.
45
This distinction between public and commercial activities was followed in a
number of subsequent decisions.46 As a result, Victory Transport became the
leading statement of commercial activity analysis in sovereign immunity cases
prior to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
41
The FSIA rejects both the classification scheme of Victory Transport and the
immunity on an action based on a contract for grain shipments. The two cases were similar, but the
results opposite. See generally Property Ownership, supra note 11, at 116; Lowenfeld, Claims Against
Foreign States-A Proposal For Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 901, 907 (1969);
Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 212; Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 436. For a fuller discussion,
see Plaintiffs Day, supra note 28, at 543.
41. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). In this case, the Comisaria
General, a branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, chartered a vessel from Victory ransport,
Inc. to carry a cargo of wheat to Spanish ports. Id. at 356. The Second Circuit found that the action by
the Comisaria General was not a strictly public or political act but rather a commercial and private act.
Id. at 360-61. It therefore denied sovereign immunity to the Spanish government. Id. at 362 n.20.
42. The court eschewed both the nature and the purpose tests for distinguishing between acts jure
imperii and acts jure gestionis. It observed that under the "nature" test, certain activities traditionally
considered exclusively within the realm of governments, such as the purchase of bullets or shoes for
an army, would be characterized as commercial. The "purpose" test was considered even more
unsatisfactory, "for conceptually the modem sovereign always acts for a public purpose." Id. at
359-60; Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 213.
43. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. von Mehren, supra note 8, at 51; Hill, supra note 18, at 180; Carl, Suing Foreign Governments
in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J.
1009, 1012 (1979). See also Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) note 55, at 1200; Petrol Shipping Corporation v.
Kingdom of Greece, Purchase Directorate, 360 F2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
394 (1966); Sea Transport Corp. v. The S/T Manhattan, 405 F Supp. 1244, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 E Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. 11. 1975); Pan
American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 296 F. Supp. 361, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
American Hawaiian Ventures v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622, 626 (D.N.J. 1966).
47. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 213; von Mehren, supra note 8, at 50; Hill, supra note 18, at
180.
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"purpose" test for distinguishing public from commercial activities. Instead it
reverts to the "nature" test, indicating that whether a foreign state's actions
constitute commercial activity is determined from the nature of the acts in ques-
tion.48 The broadest application of the nature test would afford immunity to the
sovereign only when the act is of such a nature that no party other than a
government could perform such an act.49 Because an individual cannot legislate,
a state acts jure imperii when it passes legislation. Conversely, because an indi-
vidual can borrow money or make a contract, a foreign state that borrows money
or enters into a contract engages in a commercial activity under this test.0 The
fact that goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for a
public purpose is irrelevant. It is the essentially commercial nature of an activity
or transaction that is critical.5' In this respect, the identity of the entity being sued
is irrelevant in evaluating the commercial nature of the activity in question.
5 2
While this may appear desirable upon first glance, it presents difficulties when
applied to non-market economies.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). The Section-By-Section Analysis expands on this by indicating:
[Tlhe fact that goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for a public
purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is
critical. Thus, a contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or equipment for its
armed forces or to construct a government building constitutes a commercial activity. The
same would be true of a contract to make repairs on an embassy building. Such contracts
should be considered to be commercial contracts, even if their ultimate object is to further a
public function.
HousE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6615.
49. von Mehren, supra note 8, at 49; Carl, supra note 46, at 1032.
50. Carl, supra note 46, at 1031-32; von Mehren, supra note 8, at 49. Lauterpacht, supra note 19,
at 223, argues that a nature test "merely postpones the difficulty." He contends:
To what extent is it true to say that contracts made by the state for the purchase of shoes for the
army, or of a warship, or of munitions, or of foodstuff necessary for the maintenance of the
national economy, are not immune from the jurisdiction for the reason that they are contracts
and that an individual can make a contract? For can it not be said that these particular contracts
can be made by a state only, and not by individuals? Individuals do not purchase shoes for
their armies; they do not buy warships for the use of the state; they are not, as such,
responsible for the management of the national economy.
Id.
51. HOUSE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note I, at
6615.
52. See HousE REPORT at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra
note 1, at 6613-15. See generally von Mehren, supra note 8, at 49, 53-54. The Fifth Circuit stated in
Arango v. Guzman Tavel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1379-80 (5th Cir. 1980), that:
The focus ... is not on whether the defendant generally engages in a commercial enterprise
or activity . . . ; rather, it is on whether the particular conduct giving rise to the claim in
question constitutes or is in connection with commercial activity, regardless of the defendant's
generally commercial or govemmental character.
Problems with the commercial activity exception are discussed infra in Section V of this Note.
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III. NON-MARKET ECONOMIES (NMEs)
Market and non-market societies have radically different notions of the struc-
ture and authority of the state.53 Such differences are reflected in the divergent
concepts of property ownership held by each of these societies.54 Moreover,
governmental agencies play fundamentally different roles in market and non-
market economies.5 As Sections IV and V below demonstrate, the FSIA fails to
account for the differences between these two antithetical ideologies, making it
inadequate for NMEs. A basic understanding of certain ideological differences,
particularly in the area of property ownership, is necessary to fully appreciate the
problems in the 1976 Act. The following discussion of Russian and Yugoslav
property systems serves to highlight the differences between market and non-
market ideologies. Additionally, it indicates that any amendments to the FSIA to
correct this defect must address many variations among NMEs themselves.
A. Marxism-Leninism
The socialist state, or dictatorship of the proletariat, is the intermediate phase
between capitalism and communism.5 6 The legal framework of much of the
socialist world is dominated by Marxism-Leninism, a doctrine that explains the
present world and provides a path to a better one.5 7 In the Marxist-Leninist
perspective, the nature of a society is determined by its economic infrastructure
and the conditions in which the means of production are exploited.58 All else is
superstructure, closely dependent on the economic infrastructure.5 9 Both the law
and the state are superstructures.60 They appear only when society is divided into
social classes, one of which, by seizing control of the means of production,61 is
able to economically exploit the other.62 In such a situation, the ruling class uses
the state and its laws to strengthen and perpetuate its domination.63 Thus, under
Marxism-Leninism, law is closely identified with the state. It is an instrument
designed to protect the interests of the ruling class and maintain social in-
equality.64 Class struggle is primarily the efforts of one class to seize the means of
53. See generally R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 155-66,
268-83 (2d ed. 1978).
54. Id. at 268-73. See generally A. CHLOROS, YUGOSLAV CIVIL LAW 133-209 (1970).
55. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note II, at 438. See also supra note 21.
56. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 162.
57. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 162-65.
58. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 158.
59. Id.
60. Id.





production from another and thus establish its own dictatorship.65 It is an inherent
defect in the capitalist, or bourgeois, system.66 Only when all private ownership
of the means of production is abolished, and productive property is made the
property of the collectivity, will class antagonism end.67 In the resulting society,
man will be transformed and the state and its laws will become useless and
disappear.68 Although this may seem straight forward, the manner in which it is
applied varies widely among socialist states. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
illustrate the differences.
B. U.S.S.R.
While the goal of Marxism-Leninism is a stateless/lawless ociety,69 the Sovi-
ets argue that the state must not wither away immediately.70 Rather, the state and
its laws must be maintained provisionally to economically restructure society and
destroy the selfish and anti-social tendencies inherited from centuries of poor
economic organization under bourgeois rule.7 For this reason, an essentially
economic preoccupation and instructive approach characterizes Soviet law, as
opposed to "bourgeois law" which the Soviets believe blindly tries to establish
order and morality, unobtainable in a world based on a defective economic
system.7" In conformity with this interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, most of
the property and means of production in the U.S.S.R. are exploited in accor-
dance with a five-year plan of economic development drawn up by the Soviet
leaders and approved by the Soviet parliament.7" The admitted exceptions to this
centrally developed plan, such as the complementary economy of the kolkhozi,
74
are of limited significance.75 Soviet leaders admit that they are simply another
ruling class presiding over an imperfect society, but claim to be enlightened, at
least, by Marx and Lenin, and thus advanced upon the road of progress.
76
Under Marxism-Leninism the manner in which property is appropriated is
foundational to the economic structure upon which society is based.77 Because of
the radical differences between socialist and capitalist ideas of economic and
political systems, however, the Western concept of ownership is inapplicable in
65. Id. at 159-60.
66. Id. at 163-64.
67. Id. at 160.
68. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 160-61.
69. See id. at 143.
70. See id. at 175-76.
71. See id.
72. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 163.
73. Id. at 172.
74. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
75. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 172.
76. Id. at 162-64.
77. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
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the socialist context of the people's dictatorship and collectivization of the
economy.78
As under Western ownership systems, every owner under Soviet law has the
right to possess, use, and dispose of property within the limits laid down by
law. 9 Whereas property law in Western countries is based on a unitary scheme of
private ownership,80 however, Soviet property law is predicated on public
ownership" and is composed of three different regimes: personal ownership,
cooperative ownership, and state ownership.2 Personal ownership is composed of
minor consumer goods and personal income, much like private property in
capitalist countries, and allows Soviet citizens to satisfy their personal needs.
83 It
constitutes a very minor portion of the property in the U.S.S.R.
4
While personal ownership has a Western analogue, the remaining two catego-
ries of ownership are unique to the Soviet system.s5 They constitute "socialist
ownership."8s6 Article 10 of the Soviet Constitution indicates that "socialist
ownership of the means of production in the form of state property, and collective
farm-and-cooperative property" constitutes "[t]he foundation of the economic
system of the U.S.S.R. 87 Because socialist property cannot be used for personal
78. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 144, 267-68.
79. FUNDAMENTALS OF CIVIL LEGISLATION OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS (1961), art.
19, reprinted in SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PRODEDURE 67 (Y. Sdobnikov trans. 1974) [here-
inafter FUNDAMENTALS].
80. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 269.
81. Stalin once observed of Soviet society:
The foundation of our system is public ownership, just as the foundation of capitalism is
private ownership. Whereas the capitalists have proclaimed private property rights to be sacred
and inviolable, achieving in their time the strengthening of the capitalist system, we Commu-
nists have all the more reason to proclaim public ownership sacred and inviolable, so as to
strengthen thereby the new socialist forms of economy in all fields of production and trade.
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 E Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting G.
GUINS, SOVIET LAW AND SOVIET SOCIETY 106 (1954)).
82. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 269.
83. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 270.
84. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 444 n. 143.
85. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 270.
86. See U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. 10-13, reprinted in Hazard, infra note 87, at 22-23. For the text of
Article 10, see infra note 87.
87. Article 10 of the Soviet Constitution states:
The foundation of the economic system of the USSR is socialist ownership of the means of
production in the form of state property (belonging to all the people), and collective farm-and-
cooperative property.
Socialist ownership also embraces the property of trade unions and other public organiza-
tions which they require to carry out their purposes under their rules.
The state protects socialist property and provides conditions for its growth.
No one has the right to use socialist property for personal gain or other selfish ends.
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 10, reprinted in Hazard, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 22, in 17
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1978).
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gain,88 it is difficult to compare the Soviet property system with the property
systems of capitalist countries, which tend to view personal gain as a legitimate
reason for private ownership.8 9
Cooperative ownership is exemplified by the perpetual right to exploit the land
in cooperative farms or kolkhozes.9° Land has been nationalized, so it does not
actually belong to the kolkhozi.91 Rather, the cooperative has a perpetual right of
use and enjoyment over it.92 The permanence of the right distinguishes this form
of ownership from the Western notion of benefical use, which is generally only
temporary.93 Moreover, in exchange for the right to use and enjoy the land in
perpetuity, the kolkhozi must satisfy a series of obligations to the state.94 Thus, it
is impossible to compare this second regime to an estate or the cooperative
ownership found in' laws of capitalist countries.95
State property is the principal form of socialist property96 and prevails in the
industrial sector and in the state agricultural farms (sovkhozi).97 It includes land,
buildings, structures, raw materials, and products.98 The "owner" of state prop-
88. Id. There is no right of private individual ownership of socialist property assets. See U.S.S.R.
CONST. arts. 10-13, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22-23.
89. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 426.
90. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 270. See also U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 12, reprinted
in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. Like the kolkhozes, trade unions and public organizations represent
other forms of cooperative enterprises whose property is deemed to be a part of the "socialist
property" of the Soviet Union, U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 10, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22.
For further discussion of public organizations, see infra note 102.
91. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 270. See also U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 11, reprinted
in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. For the text of Article 11, see infra note 98.
92. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 270. According to Article 12 of the Soviet
Constitution:
The property of collective farms and other cooperative organizations, and of their joint
undertakings, comprises the means of production and other assets which they require for the
purposes laid down in their rules. The land held by collective farms is secured to them for
their free use in perpetuity.
The state promotes development of collective farm-and-cooperative property and its ap-
proximation to state property.
Collective farms, like other land users, are obliged to make effective and thrifty use of the
land and to increase its fertility.
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 12, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22.
93. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 271.
94. See id. See also U.S.S.R. CONsT. art. 12, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. For the
text of Article 12, see supra note 92.
95. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 271.
96. U.S.S.R. CONST. art. I1, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. For text of Article I1, see
infra note 98.
97. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 271.
98. Article 11 of the Soviet Constitution dictates that:
State property, i.e. the common property of the Soviet people, is the principal form of
socialist property.
The land, its minerals, waters, and forests are the exclusive property of the state. The state
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erty is the state,99 or rather the people or the nation of which the state is the
provisional representative. 100 Such property is generally consigned to state eco-
nomic entities'0' and public organizations1°2 which perform a set function within
the economic plan.03
A state organization is frequently a separate juridical personality with certain
property rights, individual profit motives and the capability to sue or be sued in
owns the basic means of production in industry, construction, and agriculture; means of
transport and communication; the banks; the property of state-run trade organisations and
public utilities, and other state-run undertakings; most urban housing; and other property
necessary for state purposes.
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 11, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22.
99. "The state is the sole owner of all state property." FUNDAMENTALS art. 21, reprinted in SOVIET
CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE, supra note 79, at 67.
100. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272. See also U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 11, reprinted
in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. For the text of Article 11, see supra note 98.
101. See Recent Development, Foreign Sovereign Immunity-The Status of Legal Entities in
Socialist Countries as Defendants Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 165, 173-74 (1979) [hereinafter Legal Entities]. State economic enterprises are
entities established to conduct certain aspects of the economic activities of the state. See W. BUTLER,
SOVIET LAW 226-27 (1983). There are two categories of such entities. Osakwe, supra note 21, at 27
n.62. The first category includes those enterprises that are directly financed out of the state budget and
are clearly not independent entities. The second category, Khozraschet, refers to those enterprises
which possess, use, and dispose of "socialist property" as managers for the state, but not as owners.
This is because the state owns all means of production and economically productive property.
FUNDAMENTALS, art. 21, reprinted in SOVIET CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE, supra note 79,
at 67. See also supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. Nonetheless such entities are independent
juridical persons because they operate under the principle of economic accountability, or
Khozraschet; have the right to control and exploit the assets which have been placed in their opera-
tional management; are financially autonomous for their debts; and may sue or be sued in their own
names. Osakwe, supra note 21, at 32. The most visible Khozraschet economic enterprises are foreign
trade organizations (FTOs). FTOs are at the very center of all Soviet foreign trade operations. Id. at
26 n.56. They carry out export and import operations, each FTO having a particular function in terms
of product, geographic market, or type of service. Although they are legal persons, all of their
operations and policies are overseen and controlled by the state and its ministries.
102. Public organizations are entities designed to "promote [Soviet citizens'] political activity and
initiative and satisfaction of their various interests." U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 51, reprinted in Hazard,
supra note 87, at 29. The property of public organizations, like state property, is "socialist property."
U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 10, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. Unlike state property, however, it
can be owned by the public organization. Legal Entities, supra note 101, at 174 (citing CIVIL CODE OF
THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, art. 1, reprinted in SoVIET CIVIL LEGISLA-
TION I (W. Gray ed. 1965)). See also FUNDAMENTALS, arts. 23-24, reprinted in SOVIET CIVIL
LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE, supra note 79, at 68-69. This is because public organizations pursue
non-economic goals and their ownership is of a non-productive character. Legal Entities, supra note
101, at 174. The owner of a public organization is not specified in either the Soviet Constitution or the
1961 Fundamentals of Civil Legislation. Id. Such organizations are, however, juridical entities capa-
ble of suing, being sued, and acquiring property and non-property rights in their own names. Id.
103. See W. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 335; R. DAVID & 3. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272-73;
Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REV. 614, 630-31 (1950);
Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 451-52.
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its own name. 104 Yet, this independence is largely illusory; although the state may
assign the right to possess, use and dispose of a portion of state property to a state
organization, it does not relinquish ownership. 05 Rather it places the property in
the "operative management" of that organization, which must administer it in
accordance with the law, the charter of the organization, and the designated
purpose of the property. '06 Moreover, the terms of a concession to a state organi-
zation can always be modified unilaterally by state authorities, so the organiza-
tion never has a right that can prevail over the state itself.0 7 In this respect
governmental regulations, within the overall economic plan, determine all as-
pects of a state entity's organization and activities, including the scope of its legal
personality, separate property status, and responsibilities.0 8 State property as a
104. Fensterwald, supra note 103, at 630-31; Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 451-52. See
also W. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 335-36.
105. See U.S.S.R. CONST. arts. 10-13, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22; W. BUTLER,
supra note 101, at 169-70, 336-37.
106. W. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 170; FUNDAMENTALS, art. 21, reprinted in SOVIET CIVtL
LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURE, supra note 79, at 67.
107. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272. In a sense this is always true: the state as
sovereign may create and remove rights in any legal system. The Soviet perspective, however,
subordinates the law and even legal norms such that there is no appeal to any rights independent of the
sovereign state. Economic profitability frequently does not play a role in that decision. Capitalist
Paradigm, supra note 11, at 455.
108. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 452. In Western states, "the term 'juridical person' is a
term of art and usually means, prima facie, that the entity involved is separate and distinct from the
government." Osakwe, supra note 21, at 31 (quoting N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 316 (1973)). Under Soviet law, however, it is quite possible to be a
juridical person and an agency and instrumentality of the Soviet state at the same time. As a matter of
fact, all state juridical persons are agencies and instrumentalities of the Soviet state. Id. at 33. A
Khozraschet economic enterprise's status as a separate legal entity does not detract from its intrinsic
character as an instrumentality of the Soviet state. Such entities are unconditionally subject to the
directives of the Soviet government and its Ministries. The term "juridical person" as it applies to
state economic enterprises merely means that the entity in question has the right of control and
exploitation over the assets that have been placed under its operational management but that actually
belong to the state; that the entity operates under the regime of economic accountability
(Khozraschet); that it is financially autonomous (liable for its debts); and that the entity may sue or be
sued in its own name. Even though an economic entity may be a legal person and enjoy a certain
amount of autonomy, it is first and foremost a fictional extension of the state. The inability of an
economic organization to dispose of the state property placed under its operative management without
the consent of the state itself indicates that the juridical person is not "separate and distinct from the
government." Id. at 32.
The status of a public organization differs from that of an economic enterprise in only one critical
respect: a public organization is a "social" or non-governmental organization. See Osakwe, supra
note 21, at 33 (Osakwe uses "state juridical persons" to refer to economic entities and "nonstate
juridical persons" to refer to public organizations). George C. Guins, in his book on the Soviet legal
system, concludes that there is no real difference between economic enterprises and "voluntary
organizations" (public organizations) organized under article 51. See G. GUINS, supra note 81, at 97.
Like economic enterprises, public organizations are "always subject to government control and
directives and perform special functions inspired by the highest organs of the state." G. GUINS, supra
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rule cannot be alienated to individual citizens.109 Property produced by a state
organization using assigned property is distributed to benefit another enterprise
or a consumer in accordance with the national economic plan."10
Government planning is much more extensive in socialist states than in cap-
italist states."' While the state plays an important role in the economy of cap-
italist nations, the "flexible" economic planning that may exist in such countries
is quite distinct from the "rigid" U.S.S.R. planning. Planning in the U.S.S.R. is
not limited to setting general objectives but establishes a specific task for each
enterprise.I2 The adaptation of property to the needs of production and consump-
tion is the essence of the socialist regime of ownership."13 Under the Soviet
system, it is not really important to know who owns the property or how it can be
transferred. It is crucial, however, to know by whom, and how, property is to be
administered or exploited and in what way it will be disposed of according to the
established provisions of the national economic plan.14 Such a concept is far
removed from the capitalist view that the owner is, in principle, sovereign and the
manner in which one chooses to exploit one's property is not, as a general rule,
even taken into account by the law. "
C. Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia's approach to socialism differs markedly from that of the Soviet
Union."l6 Although Yugoslav leaders subscribe to Marxism-Leninism and its
ultimate goal of the ideal communist society, they interpret the doctrine differ-
ently than do their Soviet counterparts. I" Whereas the Russians believe the way
to achieve the ideal community is to provisionally maintain the state bureaucracy
to condition society for the new order,"8 the Yugoslavs contend that the state and
its laws must be eliminated immediately in all those areas where this can be
accomplished without endangering society's progress toward communism."' As
part of this immediate divestiture of power the Yugoslavs maintain that the means
of production must be given "in fact" to the people rather than held by the state
note 81, at 97. As such, they are instrumentalities of the Soviet government as are all juridical
persons. See G. GuINs, supra note 81, at 97; Osakwe, supra note 21, at 34.
109. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272.
110. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272.
111. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272-73.
112. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 272-73.
113. Id. at 272.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See generally A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 133-209.
117. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 187.
118. Id. at 143, 175-76. See R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 187-88. See also supra
notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
119. R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 187.
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for the people as in the U.S.S.R.20 The Yugoslavs criticize the Soviet Union's
bureaucratization of the socialist state as a departure from the Marxist path that
has created a new form of capitalist state with the Soviet ruling class as the new
bourgeois. 21
To avoid the Soviet-style central state bureaucracy, the Yugoslav socio-eco-
nomic system is decentralized122 through the active participation of workers and
salaried employees in the economic management of the country. 123 The founda-
tions of this system are social ownership of the means of production and worker
self-management; self-managed organizations of workers use socially-owned re-
sources as a means of production.2 4 The assets used by these worker organiza-
tions are classified as "social property" according to Yugoslav law. 25 Although
the Yugoslav Constitution does not expressly define "social property,126 it in-
cludes "[t]he means of production and other means of associated labour, products
generated by associated labour and income realized through associated labour,
resources for the satisfaction of common and general social needs, natural re-
sources and goods in common use. .... ",127 It is thus apparent that "social
property" includes virtually all property and resources necessary to the industrial
sector of Yugoslavia's economy.
Ownership of "social property" is also not defined in the Yugoslav Constitu-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Glickman & Sukijasovic, Yugoslav Worker Management and Its Effect on Foreign Invest-
ment, 12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 260, 262 (1971).
123. Conner, Joint Ventures in Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LAW. 45, 46 (1976). See also R. DAVID & J.
BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 188-91.
124. Conner, supra note 123, at 46. Article 10 of the Yugoslav Constitution provides:
The socialist socio-economic system of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be
based on freely associated labour and socially-owned means of production, and on self-
management by the working people in production and in the distribution of the social product
in basic and other organizations of associated labour and in social reproduction as a whole.
YUGO. CONST. art. 10, reprinted in Flanz, Yugoslavia 49, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Supp.) (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1986).
A work organization is an independent self-managing organization of workers linked in labour
by common interests and organized in basic organizations of associated labour of which the
work organization is composed, or of workers directly linked together through the unity of the
labour process.
YUGO. CONST. art. 35, para. 1, reprinted in Flanz, supra, at 59.
125. "An entity shall create the resources needed for the exercise of its activity by means of its
operations. . . . The assets of an enterprise shall be social property." Legal Entities, supra note 101,
at 175 (quoting BASIC LAW OF ENTERPRISES, art. 16, reprinted in 13 INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE
LAW: COLLECTION OF YUGOSLAV LAW 15 (B. Blagojevic ed. 1966)).
126. A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 161.
127. Yuoo. CONST. art. 12, para. 1, reprinted in Flanz, supra note 124, at 49.
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tion,125 which states only that "no one may acquire the right of ownership of
social resources." 12 9 This lack of definition has led to dispute among legal schol-
ars as to whether the state owns the "social property" assets of worker organiza-
tions.130 The confusion appears to stem from social property's dual character as
"both part of state property and separate from it."3' At one time this property
was state owned, like that in the U.S.S.R. 32 The state created "social property"
out of state property, however, when it decentralized the socio-economic struc-
ture and conferred upon workers in organizations the absolute right o use social
property in connection with their labor "to satisfy their personal and social needs
and to manage, freely and on equal footing with other workers in associated
labour, their labour and the condition and results thereof."1 33 It thus appears that
the "social property" assets of worker organizations are neither state-owned nor
privately-owned. 34 Rather they belong to all the people of Yugoslavia, but are
"held and used 'in trust' by the work organization for the general good of all the
Yugoslav people." ' 35
To this end, worker organizations are independent juridical entities with the
capacity to sue, be sued, and contract in their own names.3 6 They are also
128. Legal Entities, supra note 101, at 176.
129. No one may acquire the right of ownership of social resources which are conditions of labour
in basic and other organizations of associated labour or are the economic foundations for the
realization of the functions of self-managing communities of interest or of other self-manag-
ing organizations and communities and of socio-political communities.
YUGO. CONsT. art. 12, para. 2, reprinted in Flanz, supra note 124, at 49.
130. A. Chloros observes that "many theories have been put forward to explain the nature of social
property and the attempt of lawyers to supply a definition has caused a great deal of controversy." A.
CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 168. For a good discussion of several such theories, see A. CHLOROS,
supra note 54, at 170-181.
131. A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 175. Chloros described social property as being somewhere
"between state property and private property,... but partaking in some measure of both." He also
noted that here is state property which is separate and distinct from social property. "For example, in
Yugoslav theory State funds, army equipment, warships, and aeroplanes are considered state prop-
erty. Yugoslav theory, therefore, recognizes two kinds of property; state property and social prop-
erty." Id. Such property is necessary for defense of the country and maintenance of order and social
peace. These functions are the last to be exercised by society directly; they will be transferred to the
people only after all inequalities have disappeared. Continued exercise of such functions by the state,
however, does not prevent the state from withering away in all other respects. R. DAVID & J.
BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 190.
132. A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 162.
133. Yuo. CoNsT. art. 13, para. 1, reprinted in Flanz, supra note 124, at 49-50. See generally,
A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 162-63; R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at 188-90.
134. A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 161; Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko,
441 F Supp. 827, 831 (D.D.C. 1977).
135. Edlow, 441 F Supp. at 831.
136. Legal Entities, supra note 101, at 175 (citing BASIC LAW OF ENTERPRISES, art. 4, reprinted in
13 INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAW: COLLECrION OF YUoOSLAV LAW 15 (B. Blagojevic ed. 1966)).
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accorded some ownership rights similar to those of Western corporations.'37 The
workers in the organizations have the right to decide how to use social property
assets, what products to produce, the rate of production, the selling prices and the
marketing strategy, as well as the right (within limits) to set the organization's
policy regarding distribution or reinvestment of profits. 3 Unlike the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia has no binding overall economic plan. 139 However, all of these
rights must be exercised in a manner that is economically beneficial for society as
a whole. 40 To ensure responsible use, "[t]he rights, obligations, and respon-
sibilities concerning the disposal, utilization and management of social resources
. . . [is] . . . regulated by the constitution and statute, in line with the nature and
purpose of these resources. '14 1 Yugoslavia's socio-economic system is thus
somewhat more "democratic" than the Soviet system. 42 It is not, however, a free
market system where the use of property is largely determined by the individual
owner's interest irrespective of society as a whole. 41
137. Id. The rights of the work organization include:
(1) the right to use the property as prescribed by management;
(2) the right to alter the nature and location of the property;
(3) the right to invest or reinvest the property of the work organization;
(4) the right to combine the property with that of other work organizations;
(5) the right to sell, lease, or otherwise transfer the property of the work organization on
such terms and conditions as management deems to be in its best interests; and
(6) the right to allocate the income of the work organization from the use and investment of
the social property as management determines.
[Furthermore,] the workers, through the workers' council or founders' council, under the
right of self-management, are also the management.
Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 203 n.94 (citing Nuclearna Electrama Krsko's Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7-8.) See also Van Doren, Ownership of Yugoslav Social
Property and United States Industrial Property-A Comparison, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 73, 104
(1972).
138. Conner, supra note 123, at 46. For further enumeration of the ownership rights of worker
organizations, see supra note 137.
139. Conner, supra note 123, at 46.
140. In exercising the right to work with social resources, workers in associated labour shall in
their common and general social interest be mutually responsible for using these resources in
a socially and economically opportune manner, for constantly renewing, expanding and
improving them, as the economic foundations of their own and of total social labour, and for
fulfilling their working obligations conscientiously.
In exercise of their right to work with social resources, workers in associated labour may
not acquire material benefits or other advantages that are not based on their labour.
YuGo. CONST. art. 15, reprinted in Flanz, supra note 124, at 50.
141. YUGO. CONST. art. 13, para. 2, reprinted in Flanz, supra note 124, at 50.
142. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 447; R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, supra note 53, at
188-89; A. CHLOROS, supra note 54, at 163-65.
143. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 447.
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IV. INADEQUACY OF THE FSIA TOWARD NON-MARKET ECONOMIES
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies only to foreign states, their
agencies, or their instrumentalities."4 The Act's definition of an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" is thus extremely important. Despite the
importance of this section of the FSIA, however, the types of legal persons it
encompasses remains ambiguous.
45
The very term "agency or instrumentality" poses serious definitional prob-
lems. Whether an entity constitutes an agency or instrumentality depends largely
upon the role the entity plays in a country's economy. The roles of governmental
agencies are, however, significantly different in market and non-market econo-
mies, and the Act's definition seems tailored to market economies."
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is identified by the Act as an
entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States .... nor created
under the laws of any third country.
47
A foreign entity, claiming the defense of sovereign immunity, must satisfy all
three criteria to be deemed an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. 1
48 If
these requirements are met, immunity will be granted, subject to any interna-
tional agreements to which the United States is a party149 and unless one of the
enumerated exceptions applies.15
In most cases, it will be relatively easy to determine whether the first and third
requirements are satisfied.' However, difficulties in interpreting the second
requirement arise when applied to non-market economies.112 Although the in-
creased involvement of the Soviet Union and other socialist states in international
144. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
145. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 226.
146. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 438.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
148. The House Report labels these three requirements a "criterion," and 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2)
ends with the word "and," indicating that Congress intended that all three must be satisfied for the
entity to qualify as an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT at
15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6613-14.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. See also HOUSE REPORT at 17-18, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6616.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. See also HOUSE REPORT at 18-22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6616-21.
151. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 226.
152. See generally Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11; Recent Developments, supra note 1;
Property Ownership, supra note II; Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 226-29; Legal Entities, supra
note 101.
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trading was a major force in the development of restricted sovereign immunity,'53
the FSIA fails to take into account the nature of socialist states.154 This problem is
illustrated by two cases in which the courts reached seemingly inconsistent
results.
A. The FSIA Created Confusion in the Courts: Novosti and Edlow
1. Novosti: ownership test
In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency,151 plaintiff brought a libel action
against Novosti Press Agency, a "mass organization" functioning as "an infor-
mation agency of Soviet public organizations."'56 The suit was based on al-
legedly defamatory articles written and subsequently published by the agency.
Novosti advanced a defense of immunity from suit claiming that it was owned by
the state according to the provisions of the FSIA. 57 The plaintiff conceded that
Novosti met the first and third requirements of the definition of an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state." He argued, however, that the U.S.S.R. did
not own a majority of Novosti's property assets. It therefore failed to meet the
definition's second requirement and could not be considered an agency of the
U.S.S.R. for immunity purposes."8
The court analyzed the status of Novosti under the "ownership test" of 28
U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2), relying heavily on the socialist concept of property
ownership. Looking to the Constitution of the Soviet Union for a theoretical
explanation of Soviet "ownership," and to Stalin's writings on the sacredness and
inviolability of public ownership, the court found that the land, natural resources,
banks, transport facilities, farms and means of communication are "state prop-
erty, that is, belong to the whole people." 5 9 Moreover, the court discovered that,
in practice, the Soviet government gave Novosti the use of buildings, commu-
nications facilities, furniture, and equipment, which accounted for sixty-three
percent of its property assets.160
The court then noted that as a juridical personality, Novosti was empowered
with property and contract rights, could sue and be sued, was financially respon-
153. See Fensterwald, supra note 103, at 614. See also supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
155. 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
156. NovosTJ PRESS AGENCY STATUTE § I(I), quoted in Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency,
443 F Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Novosti is a "mass organization" arising under Article 126
of the U.S.S.R. Constitution which was slightly amended in 1977 as Article 51. Under the 1977
Constitution "mass organization" was amended to read "public organization." See supra note 128.
The Novosti statute is the charter for the Novosti Press Agency.
157. Novosti, 443 F. Supp. at 850-51.
158. Id. at 852.
159. Id. at 853-54.
160. Id. at 853.
FSIA 181
sible for its obligations and was self-administering.16 Even though Novosti had
free use, management and control of state property, however, the state still had
ultimate ownership. Possession, use, and disposition of state property by juridical
persons does not equal ownership in the U.S.S.R.162 Rather, Novosti's control
over state property assets was "something less than ownership, but something
more than giving orders." 163 Novosti's free use, management and control of state
property making up sixty-three percent of its fixed assets constituted a Soviet
state majority ownership interest in Novosti and thus qualified it as a Soviet
agency. The court also found that because of its "essentially public nature,"
Novosti was an organ of the U.S.S.R.164 Therefore, the court held that Novosti
qualified for sovereign immunity.
6
1
2. Edlow: government function and state control tests
While the court in Novosti considered the system of ownership in the U.S.S.R.
crucial, the court in Edlow International Company v. Nuklearna Elektrarna
Krsko, 166 found this factor nondeterminative.167 In that case, a Bermuda corpora-
tion which acted as broker in the sale of uranium fuel sued the defendant
Yugoslav nuclear power plant for broker's fees.'68 The court refused to accept
plaintiff's contention that "virtually every enterprise operated under a socialist
system [is] an instrumentality of the state within the terms of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976."169 It observed that "[tihe Act's legislative his-
tory evinces Congress' intent that the definition of 'agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state' be read broadly to encompass a 'variety of forms'. . .. 70 But it
found no support in the legislative history for the proposition that a "foreign
state's system of property ownership, without more, should be determinative on
the question whether an entity operating within the state is a state agency or
161. Id.
162. Ownership is defined in Soviet law . .. as including the right of possession, use, and
disposition of the thing which is owned. What the state owns it has a right to possess, use,
and dispose of. But what a state economic enterprise possesses, u es, and disposes of-it
does not own! May one speak then of a "right" of possession, use, and disposition in a state
economic enterprise? Or does not the enterprise merely exercise certain economic-admin-
istrative functions delegated to it by the state?
Id. (quoting H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 115 (1963)). See also supra notes 85-110 and
accompanying text.
163. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F Supp. 849, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting
H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 116 (1963)).
164. Id. at 854.
165. Id.
166. 441 F Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
167. Id. at 832.
168. Id. at 828-30.
169. Id. at 831.
170. Id.
182 NOTES
instrumentality under the Act.''7 Therefore, rather than focusing on the
Yugoslav system of property ownership, the court considered what it felt were
"[tiwo more precise indices of an entity's status as state agency or instrumen-
tality," namely the degree to which the entity discharges a government function,
and the extent of state control over the entity's operation.
72
Under the "government function" test, the Edlow court found that, in generat-
ing and distributing electric power, NEK was not performing a government
function.'73 The court concluded that although subject to considerable govern-
mental regulation, work organizations in Yugoslavia are more comparable to
private corporations in the United States than to state-owned entities.7 4 With
respect to the "control" test, the court observed that Article 35 of the Yugoslav
Constitution defines a "work organization" as independent and self-managing, at
least in its day-to-day operations. 175 The court determined that the daily opera-
tions of NEK were virtually free of direct control by the government, and found
that the government did not subsidize NEK, held no seats on its board of directors
and otherwise did not participate in the daily management of NEK's opera-
tions.176 Since NEK was neither fulfilling a government function nor subject to
government control, it did not meet the requirements of the Act's definition of a
foreign state. Because NEK was not a foreign state,177 and because the court
found that it lacked diversity jurisdiction,
178 it dismissed the case.179
B. Courts' Difficulties Arose from Inapplicability of Ownership Test to
NMEs
Novosti and Edlow can be distinguished on their facts. The cases, nevertheless,
represent two distinct approaches to the "agency or instrumentality" definition,
one giving considerable and perhaps dispositive weight to general notions of
public ownership in socialist states, the other emphasizing the functions of the
entity involved and the nature of its relationship to its government.18 0 Both the
Novosti and Edlow courts, however, found the majority ownership test of 28
U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) to be "ill-suited" to the concept of "socially-owned" prop-
171. Id. at 832.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. For a discussion of Yugoslav work organizations, see supra notes 136-41 and accompany-
ing text.
175. Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D.D.C.
1977).
176. Id. at 832.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 831.
179. Id. at 832.
180. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 228.
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erty, which is the principal form of ownership in socialist economic systems like
Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R.
5
8
The difficulty arises because the Act's ownership interest test is better designed
to apply to capitalist states such as the United States or the United Kingdom,
where the economic systems are based on private ownership. 182 No right exists in
socialist societies to privately own "socialist property," which comprises the
assets of legal entities such as worker organizations in Yugoslavia"3 and state
economic enterprises, collective farms, and public organizations in the Soviet
Union.14 The legislative history of the FSIA does not indicate whether the
socialist system of public ownership is itself sufficient reason to treat an entity as
a foreign state. 185 If a nation's system of property ownership were alone determin-
ative of whether an entity is an agency or instrumentality under the Act, then
every entity of a socialist state arguably would be an agency or instrumentality.
86
Because the Act focuses the jurisdictional inquiry primarily on the nature of the
activity, rather than on the entity being sued, it appears that Congress may not
have intendeJ to include every single entity of a socialist country within the
definition. 87 On the other hand, it seems clear that the application of the defini-
tion was intended to be almost mechanical, obviating any intricate functional
analysis which could give rise to factual disputes and uncertainties regarding the
body of jurisdictional law relevant to a particular case. 88 Yet, if concepts more
nebulous than ownership are employed in determining agency status, then such
uncertainties do arise, leaving court judgments open to dispute.8 9
The difference between capitalist and socialist property systems is complicated
by differences in property systems among socialist states themselves. As Section
III above illustrates, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. have radically different no-
181. The Novosti court explicitly recognized that the ownership test, "which seems designed to
establish the degree of the foreign state's identification with the entity under consideration, is ill-
suited to concepts which exist in socialist states such as the Soviet Union." Yessenin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency, 443 F Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Edlow International Co. v.
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 E Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C. 1977) (foreign state's property system
not determinative of agency status when more precise indices available); Capitalist Paradigm, supra
note 11, at 444, 449-58; Legal Entities, supra note 101, at 181-83.
182. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 449-51,457-58; Legal Entities, supra note 101, at
181.
183. Legal Entities, supra note 101, at 181. See also supra notes 124-41 and accompanying text.
184. Legal Entities, supra note 101, at 181. See supra notes 90-110.
185. HousE REPORT at 15-16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note
1, at 6614-15.
186. Brower, Bistline & Loomis, supra note 29, at 203.
187. See Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 227. See, e. g., HOUSE REPORT at 15-16, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6614-15.
188. Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 228. See generally HOUSE REPORT at 15, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note I, at 6614.
189. See generally Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 228-29; Legal Entities, supra note 101, at
183; Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 447.
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tions of property law. Soviet law distinguishes among various "owners" of so-
cialist property, 190 whereas Yugoslavia does not even define social property or its
owners. 191 To make an accurate determination of property ownership a court must
deal not only with the differences between market and non-market economies, it
also must be attuned to variations among non-market systems themselves. Com-
bined with Western unfamiliarity with socialist ownership concepts, this diffi-
culty opens the door to the very uncertainties, inconsistencies and unfair
decisions Congress sought to avoid under the FSIA through an ownership test. 192
C. Possible Solutions to the FSIA's Inadequate Definition of "Foreign
State"
1. Government function test is unworkable
To redress the deficiency in the Act caused by the Act's use of capitalist
concepts,93 the Edlow court, and apparently the Novosti court as well, adopted a
190. See U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 10, reprinted in Hazard, supra note 87, at 22. See also supra notes
81-110 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
192. See generally HousE REPORT at 7, 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws, supra note 1, at 6605, 6610. Additional problems could arise, because theoretically the actual
composition of the socialist framework changes over the course of the state's historical development.
See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 444. In the early stages of the transition from capitalism to
communism the state may own and control nearly everything. In the later stages, on the other hand,
the people will have organized themselves into cooperative entities while the monolithic state withers
away. Id. To accurately determine the disposition of property in a socialist system, the court must be
able to determine the society's present stage in the evolutionary process. Id. However, all of this is
purely theoretical. To date, no socialist state has hown any sign of withering away, and none appears
likely to do so in the foreseeable future.
193. Some courts appear to have responded to the difficulties in applying the majority ownership
test to socialist entities by forgoing all analysis and simply assuming that any entity from a socialist
system is necessarily a state agency or instrumentality. For example, in Patterson, Zochonis (U.K.)
Ltd. v. Compania United Arrow, 493 F Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the China Ocean Shipping
Corporation (COSCO), an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China (PRC),
was sued for shipping losses. Id. at 622-23. The court observed that it "seemed clear" that COSCO
was an "agency or instrumentality" of the PRC. It appeared to consider no evidence at all on this
point, but simply to judge impressionistically that an entity from a communist state, even if corporate
by name, had to be state-owned or state-controlled. Id. at 623.
Other courts have relied on the way in which the government of the socialist state in question chose
to characterize the ownership during litigation, In several cases the only proof of ownership has been
an affidavit or the oral testimony of a government official. Varges, Defining a Sovereign for Immunity
Purposes: Proposals to Amend the International Law Association Draft Convention, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 103, 146 (1985). In S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983), the
court found persuasive an affidavit from the Romanian Consul that the entity in question was "a state
foreign trade company wholly-owned by the Romanian Government." Id. at 415. Such an approach is
unreliable because it allows a foreign state to manipulate the evidence so that the case comes under
the FSIA. See Varges, supra, at 146. For example, some Romanian legal experts would probably
refute the court's finding that Masinexportimport was an agency or instrumentality of Romania. Id. at
146 n. 176.
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function test: if an entity discharges a government function or is of an "essen-
tially public nature," it is an organ of the government.194 Such a test is a dan-
gerous proposition for it introduces the element of public purpose into the
analysis.'95 The state, even when engaging in trade or management of industry,
always acts as a public person for the general benefit of the community as a
whole.9 6 In a non-market system, where the state is viewed as an indivisible
whole and virtually all economic and social activity is planned or controlled by
the government, the entities engaged in such activities could be seen as mere
extensions of the state imbued with public purpose.197 Thus, when applied in a
socialist setting, a test establishing organizations with an essentially public nature
as organs of the state could have the same effect as the ownership test: all entities
would be deemed to be "foreign states" for immunity purposes.98 Such a stan-
dard places the private litigant at an extreme disadvantage because all socialist
defendants could plead immunity.'99
2. The Edlow government control test does not provide viable standards to
define control
The Edlow court's control test2°° is a better standard than the function approach
discussed above, but it is not a solution to the FSIA's deficiencies. The control
test appears to work well because although communist or socialist political
theory suggests that most of the property in such a state is owned or controlled by
the state,201 in reality some enterprises appear to function independently of gov-
ernment control.202 In such a system, who administers the property and in what
way it is operated to benefit society as a whole or satisfy the central economic
plan is far more important than who actually "owns" the property.203 A definition
of "agency or instrumentality" could focus, therefore, on the degree of govern-
mental control exerted over a particular entity. If the government exercises uch
influence over the daily operations of the entity that it deprives the entity of its
194. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("essen-
tially public nature of . . . organizations . . . in the Soviet Union"); Edlow International Co. v.
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 E Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C. 1977) ("degree to which the entity
discharges a government function"). See also supra text accompanying notes 164 and 172.
195. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note I1, at 445; Legal Entities, supra note l01, at 182.
196. Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 224.
197. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 445.
198. See Fensterwald, supra note 103, at 617. See generally supra text accompanying note 186.
199. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 456.
200. See supra text accompanying note 172.
201. See supra notes 87-114, 126-41 and accompanying text.
202. This point is illustrated by defendant NEK in the Edlow case. NEK for all intents and
purposes was a separate entity similar to a corporation or other private organization. It was set up to be
a "workers' organization," separate from the government of Yugoslavia. Despite the socialist form of
government, NEK appeared on paper to be uncontrolled by the Yugoslav government. See supra text
accompanying notes 130-31; Property Ownership, supra note 11, at 121.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
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independence and autonomy, then the entity is an "agent or instrumentality" of
that foreign state.2" The control test avoids discussion of the political theory
underlying non-market systems and focuses on what is a more relevant criterion
in determining agency status-how much the daily operations of the enterprise
are controlled by the government.05 Because systems founded on the principle of
private ownership tend to equate ownership with control,2°6 a control test would
also work in free market societies, where private ownership is the norm.
27
Despite these advantages, the control test is not a truly viable solution to the
problems inherent in the present statute. The political and economic differences
between two antithetical societies cannot simply be disregarded. Perhaps the
greatest drawback of a control test is the complexity of the notion of "control"
over the affairs of an entity.208 Differences in legal and economic systems, and
within particular types of systems such as socialism, °20 make it extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine exactly what factors should be considered in
gauging the level of control exerted by the government. Factors applicable to one
country may be grossly inapposite for another.210 Moreover, the level of control
required before an entity loses its autonomy varies with the circumstances."'
Any statutory list of factors to be examined when determining the level of control
may overlook several considerations relevant to a particular case or a particular
economic or political system. Leaving the standards solely to the courts, how-
ever, could give rise to inconsistent court-created criteria, resulting in arbitrary,
unpredictable decisions.1 2 Both the private litigant and the defendant entity
204. Edlow International Co. v. Nukleama Elektrama Krsko, 441 F Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C.
1977) (The court noted that in an analogous case under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346
(1970), the critical factor was the "power of the federal government 'to control the detailed physical
performance of the contractor."' Id. (quoting United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814) (1976)).
205. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 447; Property Ownership, supra note 11, at 122.
206. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1-7 (1984).
207. Id.
208. G. Delaume states that 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)(2)'s ownership criterion is "[biased on a possibly
crude but simple test, [which] affords a practical solution to a perennial problem. It has the advantage
of avoiding the complexities of such notions as 'control'...." 2 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL
CONTRACTS, APPLICABLE LAWS AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES § 11.02, at 12 (1986).
209. The differences among socialist systems are highlighted by the differences between Soviet
and Yugoslav socialism. Although both countries are socialist, with no right to private ownership of
productive property, the degree and nature of state involvement in the economy varies markedly. See
supra Section III of this Note.
210. See supra Section III of this Note. For an entity in the U.S.S.R., courts would have to
consider the role of the Soviet Union's centralized economic planning when determining the degree of
government control over the entity. Such a consideration, however, would not be relevant to a
Yugoslav entity because no such planning is employed. Rather the social plan would have to be taken
into account. See id.
211. See generally supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
212. The problem of developed standards is highlighted in Novosti and Edlow. Each court exam-
ined different aspects of the defendant entity's existence in reaching its decision. See supra text
accompanying notes 159-79; Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 1I, at 427.
FSIA 187
would be subject to extreme uncertainty as to the defendant's status for immunity
purposes. Congress apparently recognized this for it adopted the majority
ownership test precisely to relieve the courts from a determination of control by
the state.213
In addition, the fact that an entity has control over its daily operations is largely
irrelevant in a socialist society. The governmentally formulated economic or
social plan of such a society dictates the exact purpose and focus of each organi-
zation.2 14 Entities under such a plan must operate to meet their specified goals,
215
or for the benefit of the community as a whole,216 and cannot operate for personal
gain.217 By controlling the purpose and goals of an organization, the government
can, for practical purposes, control all significant administrative decisions.
Finally, a control test poses a problem in a socialist or communist society
because of the close relationship between the party and the state. In capitalist
societies a political party is distinct from the state.218 In socialist states, however,
it is often difficult to extricate the two. There is only one party and thus it is the
state.219 Party controlled entities may be used to discharge government func-
tions.220 Under a simple control test, it is unclear how such entities should be
treated. Although these entities are not controlled by the government itself, they
213. See supra note 208.
214. See supra notes 73, 111-14, 134-41 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 94, 101-08, 111-14 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 67, 88-89, 129, 134-41 and accompanying text.
218. See M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES, THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE
MODERN STATE 392-412 (B. North & R. North eds. 1964). See generally H. BERMAN, THE Rus-
SIANS IN Focus 175 (1953). For a discussion of party systems, see J. JuPP, POLITICAL PARTIES 1-21
(1968).
219. The Soviets are guided by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A. DENISOV & M.
KIRICHENKO, SOVIET STATE LAW 143 (1960). However, the Communist Party and the Soviet state are
not actually synonymous-each is a distinct entity. Id. Nonetheless, the Party takes an active part in
the formation of the state organs.
The Communist Party directs the selection, distribution and training of the personnel of the
Soviet state apparatus; it checks the activity of the organs of state power and state administra-
tion. Not a single important decision is taken by the Soviet state organs without preliminary
guiding directions and advice from the Party. In this way the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union imparts a planned and purposeful character to the work of the entire Soviet state
apparatus.
Id. The Party carries out its decisions by directing the activity of state organs rather than by
supplanting those organs. Id. See also J. HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 46, 51,
57-8 (5th ed. 1980); D. SCOTT, RUSSIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 138 (3rd ed. 1965); H. BERMAN,
supra note 218, at 187; Capitalist Paradigm, supra note Il, at 458 n.255. See generally W. BUTLER,
supra note 101, at 145-63.
220. See A. DENIsov & M. KIRICHENKO, supra note 219, at 143. See also D. SCOTT, supra note
219, at 179; H. BERMAN, supra note 218, at 187; Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 458 n.255.
See generally W. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 145-63.
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are controlled by those in power.22' Therefore they are effectively controlled by
the state. Should they be treated as an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state," even though technically the government does not control them? If they are
not, then form dominates substance and the results of a particular case could turn
on how a country chooses to formally structure the control of its "agencies,"
rather than on the effective control of those entities.
3. The United Kingdom's State Immunity Act accounts for variations in eco-
nomic/political systems
A better way to resolve the problem of the FSIA's definition of an "agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" is to employ an approach similar to that taken
by the United Kingdom in its State Immunity Act of 1978 (SIA).222 The SIA does
not use the term "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," thereby avoiding
the need to define it.223 Instead, the SIA presumptively protects only states,
224
which it defines to include, in addition to the state itself,225 only the head of
state,226 the "government,"227 and "any department of that government."228 The
Act expressly does not cover "any entity" that is distinct from the executive
organs of the government of the state and capable of suing or being sued.22 9 Such
221. A. DENISOV & M. KIRICHENKO, supra note 219, at 143; D. Scorr, supra note 219, at 179; H.
BERMAN, supra note 218, at 175, 187. See also Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 458 n.255. See
generally W. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 145-63.
222. State Immunity Act 1978, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1123 (1978)
(published by AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.). Section 14 of the SIA provides:
(I) The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this Act apply to any foreign or
commonwealth State other than the United Kingdom; and references to a State include
references to-
(a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his public capacity;
(b) the government of that State; and
(c) any department of that government,
but not to any entity (hereafter referred to as a "separate entity") which is distinct from the
executive organs of the government of the State and capable of suing or being sued.
(2) A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom
if, and only if-
(a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority;
and
(b) the circumstances are such that a State ... would have been so immune.
Id. at 1127.




226. State Immunity Act 1978, § 14 (1)(a), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, Supra note
222, at 1127.
227. Id. (§ 14(l)(b)).
228. Id. (§ 14(l)(c)).
229. Id. (§ 14(1)).
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a separate entity is jurisdictionally immune "only if the proceedings relate to
anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority;230 and the circum-
stances are such that a State . . . would have been so immune."23"' Thus, im-
plicitly, the government of a foreign state includes entities that are capable of
suing and being sued, but that are not distinct from the government involved.
232
Whether an entity that is capable of suing and being sued is "distinct from the
executive organs of the government" is a question of fact and depends on foreign
law.233 In other words, the status of a foreign entity depends on the status confer-
red on it by the law of the state in which the entity was organized rather than on
the factual situation or the law of the forum.234 If the entity is intended by the
legislator to be distinct, then the fact that it acts in accordance with the directions
of the government does not matter. Conversely, if the entity is not intended by the
law to be distinct, its actual independence of government organs cannot deprive it
of immunity.
235
The SIA's definition of a foreign state represents a significant improvement
over its counterpart in the FSIA. By focusing on clear categories of structures
deemed to qualify as foreign states, the U.K. Act avoids the definitional difficul-
ties of "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. ' 236 Moreover, the SIA
implicitly recognizes that different countries have different notions of what con-
stitutes a state.237 Appealing to the law of the foreign state in determining an
entity's status allows the SIA to take into account the differences between various
economic/political systems.238 This is important because in socialist, or non-
market, societies, separate entities are often used to perform what are seen as
state functions.239 The FSIA fails to consider this because it applies capitalist
notions to all entities, regardless of the ideology of their home state.
24
0
Although the SIA's definition has significant advantages over the FSIA, it is
not without its own flaws. Defining the state as including "the government" is
230. Id. (§ 14(2)(a)).
231. Id. (§ 14(2)(b)).
232. Delaume, The State Immunity Act of the United Kingdom, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 185, 187
(1979); G. DELAUME, supra note 208, § 11.02, at 10.
233. Mann, The State Immunity Act of 1978, 50 BRIr Y.B. INT'L L. 43, 48 (1979).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Note, The State Immunity Act of 1978, 42 MODERN L. REv. 72, 73 (1979).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35.
238. Id. See also G. DELAUME, supra note 208, § 11.02, at 9. See generally Singer, supra note 18.
(Singer proposes that the doctrine of restrictive immunity should be analyzed in terms of jurisdiction
to prescribe rules of law. Under his thesis, the law of the country with the authority to legislate the
particular act and actor in question should be used to determine the status of that actor and act. In his
view, this avoids the problem of extending the forum state's jurisdiction beyond the limits of interna-
tional law and adds a definiteness, otherwise lacking, to immunity decisions.); Mann, supra note
233, at 48.
239. See supra notes 21, 96-108, 122-41 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 146, 182-92 and accompanying text.
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universally accepted.2 41 Because the state is merely an abstraction, it is the
government and the sovereign that represent he state and act on its behalf.2 42 By
government what is normally meant is the central government.43 To avoid any
possible confusion as to what the term "the government" includes, however, the
SIA could be improved by expressly stating that "the government" refers only to
the central government.2"
Just as the state is an abstraction, so too is the government. It is composed of
the sovereign and individual organs and agencies all operating on its behalf.
45
The SIA recognizes this abstraction by including the "sovereign"246 and "depart-
ment[s] of th[e] government"2 47 in the list of structures recognized as states. The
term "department," however, implies a narrow structure that could exclude en-
tities not traditionally viewed as departments, such as governmental boards,
commissions, cabinets, and ministries. 4 The Act should make clear that such
entities are included in the definition of a state.2 49 This could be done by using the
term "state organ" which possesses a broader scope incorporating such en-
tities.2 50 It should be explicitly indicated, however, that the term "state organ"
does not include any entity of separate legal status.25
Furthermore, the State Immunity Act expressly leaves the treatment of constit-
uent territories of a federal state to future implementation by means of Orders in
Council dealing with individual cases.252 Although there is no consensus on
whether subnational geographical units should constitute a state for sovereign
immunity purposes, avoiding the issue creates a great deal of uncertainty as to
how such entities will be treated for any given activity.2 53 Since such entities, like
other legally distinct entities, can exercise sovereign authority as delegated by the
state,2  they should be granted sovereign status when exercising such author-
241. Varges, supra note 193, at 124; W. BisHoP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (1971); RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (REVISED) § 201 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
242. Varges, supra note 193, at 124.
243. Id.
244. See Varges, supra note 193, at 125. (Although Varges' suggestions relate to the International
Law Association Draft Convention on Sovereign Immunity, many of the comments are also relevant
to the State Immunity Act of 1978 because it takes substantially the same form.)
245. Varges, supra note 193, at 124.
246. See State Immunity Act 1978, § 14(l)(a), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra
note 222, at 1127.
247. See id. (§ 14(1)(c)).
248. Varges, supra note 193, at 124.
249. See Varges, supra note 193, at 124-25.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 125.
252. State Immunity Act 1978, § 14(5), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 222,
at 1127. See also Delaume, supra note 232, at 187-88 (1979); Mann, supra note 233, at 48-9.
253. Varges, supra note 193, at 125.
254. See generally supra notes 21, 96-114, 134-41 and accompanying text.
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ity.255 In any case where such a unit claims it is acting in sovereign authority, the
state to which the unit belongs should be required to certify the state's agreement
with the entity's claim. 2 6 In this way the foreign government would be forced to
take an active role in evaluating whether sovereign authority had been delegated
to the entity.257 This standard should apply to all legally distinct entities.
258
D. Proposed Amendment to FSIA § 1603(a) and (b) Definition of
Foreign State
With the benefits and problem areas of the SIA in mind, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)
and (b) of the FSIA should be amended to incorporate a modified version of § 14
of the SIA and read as follows:
A "foreign state" includes:
(1) the sovereign or other head of the state in his public capacity,
(2) the central government of the state,
(3) any department of the central government of the State
(i) A department of the central government includes state organs
which are not legally distinct from the central government.
(ii) A department of the central government does not include any
entity (hereafter referred to as a "separate entity") which is legally
distinct from the central government and capable of suing or being sued.
(4) Any constituent unit or other geographical subdivision of the state,
but only for those acts or omissions which it claims are in the sovereign
authority, i.e., jure imperii, of the central government of the state, provided
the central government supports that claim. This support must be evidenced
by certification from the ministry of foreign affairs or any other department
representing the central government of the foreign state.
(5) Any "separate entity," but only for those acts or omissions which it
claims are in the sovereign authority, i.e., jure imperii, of the central govern-
ment of the state, provided the central government supports that claim. This
support must be evidenced by certification from the central government of the
foreign state as provided in (4). A "separate entity" means any entity:
(i) which is created by, or under the laws of, the foreign state,
(ii) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(iii) which is capable of suing or being sued.
At first glance the term "sovereign authority," in sections (4) and (5) of the
above proposal, may appear to entail the same problems as "public purpose,"
255. See generally Varges, supra note 193, at 126-29.
256. See Varges, supra note 193, at 128.
257. See id. at 128, 136.
258. See id. at 122-23.
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namely all governmental acts are sovereign.259 "Sovereign authority," however,
need not be defined as broadly as "public purpose. "260 Rather, as the next section
demonstrates, "sovereign authority" can be restricted to a limited group of
activities, which do not include commercial activities.
V. DEFICIENCIES IN THE FSIA's COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION
Once it is determined that a particular entity is covered by the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act,2 61 it must then be determined whether the particular
transaction or event in question is one for which Act provides immunity.2 62 In
adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity the FSIA attempts to dis-
continue the competitive advantages that sovereigns engaged in state trading and
other commercial enterprises often gain through immunity from suit.2 63 The Act
is structured in such a way that the definition of a foreign state is closely linked
with the commercial nature of the act in question. A foreign state may escape
jurisdiction upon establishing either that the actor was not an agent or instrumen-
tality of that state or that its act was not commercial in nature.264 Although there
are other exceptions to immunity,2 65 the commercial activity exception is really
the core of the Act. 266 Yet, despite this importance, the standard for commercial
activity remains unclear.
267
A. The FSIA, Its Legislative History, United States Case Law, and
International Law do not Adequately Define "Commercial Activity"
The FSIA defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of commer-
cial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." 268 The commercial
character of the act in question is determined by reference to its nature, rather
259. Mann, supra note 233, at 51.
260. Id.
261. For a discussion of the problems involved in deciding whether an entity is covered by the
FSIA, see supra Section IV of this Note.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35, 48-52.
263. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note !1, at 426. See also supra Section III of this Note. The
legislative history indicates that "American citizens are increasingly coming into contact with foreign
states and entities owned by foreign states. These interactions arise in a variety of circumtances, and
they call into question whether our citizens will have access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary
legal disputes." House REPORT at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra
note 1, at 6605.
264. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
265. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605; supra text accompanying note 33.
266. See supra text accompanying note 34; Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their
Corporations: Sovereign Immunity (Part I1), 85 COM. L.J. 228, 230 (1980). See generally von
Mehren, supra note 8, at 48-54; Hill, supra note 18, at 205-06.
267. See generally von Mehren, supra note 8, at 48-54; Hill, supra note 18, at 205-06.
268. A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular
commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined
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than its purpose.269 The rejection of the purpose test represents a significant
departure from the test previously adopted by the Second Circuit in Victory
Transport2 0 that considered both the nature and the purpose of the activity.27 The
court in that case classified public loans and acts "concerning the armed forces"
as "political or public acts."' 272 Thus, under Victory Transport, a contract to
purchase boots for the military of a foreign nation would be a public act because
it concerns the armed forces.273 In contrast, the House Report states that a
contract to buy provisions or equipment for the armed forces would be a commer-
cial activity under the 1976 Act.
274
Despite what one court has termed "the relatively straightforward language
employed" in defining "commercial activity,2 75 the definition is in fact self-
contradictory. Although the FSIA rejects the purpose of an act as a criterion of its
commercial character,276 the very term "commercial" suggests purpose and noth-
ing else as the determinant of its presence.277 How else does one determine the
"commercial nature" of an act except by examining its purposes? The legislative
history itself recognizes this when its first example of a commercial act is one
carried on for profit, which is a purpose.278 Nature and purpose interact so closely
that independently neither is an effective criterion for identifying a commercial
act.
279
by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than
by reference to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(3)(d).
269. See supra notes 48-52, 268 and accompanying text.
270. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 E2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 934 (1965).
271. See Victory Transport, 336 F2d at 359-60; supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. See
also von Mehren, supra note 8, at 52-53; Carl, supra note 46, at 1032.
272. Victory Transport, 336 E2d at 360; Carl, supra note 46, at 1032.
273. Victory llansport, 336 F.2d at 359.
274. HousE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at
6615; Carl, supra note 46, at 1032. In National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F
Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the defendant claimed immunity in a suit based upon a contract for
cement to be delivered in Nigeria, because some of the cement was intended for use in governmental
works and military installations. The court held this transaction was a commercial arrangement,
despite the possible military use. No convincing proof had been submitted at the trial to show that a
major or substantial portion of the cement was procured with a governmental purpose in mind.
Moreover, under the FSIA, the court stated the purpose would be irrelevant. Id. at 641-42.
275. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F Supp. 384, 394 (D.Del. 1978). Despite such
language, Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 239, approve of this case, but they seem generally
unconcerned about the subtleties hidden in the concept of commercial act, id. at 236-44.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). See also supra text accompanying notes 48, 269.
277. Dellapenna, supra note 266, at 232.
278. HOUSE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at
6615.
279. See generally Victory ransport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F2d 354, 359-60 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
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More importantly, the definition of "commercial activity" is deficient in that it
uses the term "commercial" to define "commercial activity."280 Nothing in the
FSIA or the legislative history provides any more precise meaning than the
general term itself.28" ' The House Report does offer some examples of commercial
activity to guide courts, such as selling products or services, leasing property,
borrowing money, and purchasing securities in an American corporation.282 The
term "regular course of commercial conduct" includes the carrying on of com-
mercial enterprises such as an airline, a mineral extraction company, or a state
trading corporation.283 If an exhaustive list of such examples could be made,
interpretation would be quite simple.284 Congress apparently felt such a list to be
impossible.285 Believing it to be unwise and impractical to attempt more precise
definition, Congress chose instead to give the courts a "great deal of latitude" in
determining the scope of the exception.28 6 The examples offered as guidance,
however, are simply too insubstantial to be the sole indications of what is
commercial. 287
Commentators have suggested that the courts look to the legislative history of
the Act, United States case law, and principles of international law for guidance
in distinguishing between governmental and commercial acts.88 As noted above,
however, the discussion of the commercial activities exception in the legislative
history provides little real aid in evaluating state behavior.289 American case law
280. McCormick, supra note 1, at 490.
281. See Dellapenna, supra note 266, at 231-32. See generally HOUSE REPORT, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6604-35.
282, HOUSE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at
6615.
283. Id. at 6614-15.
284. Dellapenna, supra note 266, at 232.
285. Id.; Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 236. The drafters felt that complex commercial
transactions can take an infinite variety of shapes in today's world, and they were reluctant to attempt
to codify these diverse transactions in the rigid form of a statute. Consequently, a deliberate decision
was made to allow the law to develop on a case-by-case basis within a framework of general common
law of sovereign immunity. Feldman, supra note 4, at 311; 1976 Hearings, supra note 21, at 53
(Testimony of Monroe Leigh).
286. "The courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity'
for purposes of this bill. It has seemed unwise to attempt an excessively precise definition of this
term, even if that were practicable." HOUSE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6615.
287. See Dellapenna, supra note 266, at 232-33.
288. Note, "Commercial Activity" Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Toward a
More Practical Definition, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 302 (1982) [hereinafter Practical Definition].
The court in Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F2d 300, 309-10
(2d Cir. 1981), also examined these three areas for guidance in evaluating the commercial nature of the
contracts involved. The court, nonetheless, voiced its dissatisfaction with the 1976 Act's guidance.
See infra notes 296-302; Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 237; Judicial Control, supra note 19, at
438.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 275-87.
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is also a poor source from which to glean the meaning of "commercial activity."
The Act superseded the guidelines set out in the leading American case prior to
the adoption of the Act,29° including that case's definition of "commercial ac-
tivity. "291 Judicial determinations prior to that case were made on a number of
inconsistent grounds; some courts looked to the nature of the activity, others to its
purpose.292 Because these conflicting United States precedents offer little help in
adjudicating sovereign immunity pleas, some commentators advocate that inter-
national law is a more "fruitful source of guidance. "293 Once again, however,
although 28 U.S.C. § 1602, entitled "Findings and declaration of purpose,"
contains a "cryptic reference to international law, [it] wholly fails to adopt it."
294
Nothing in the FSIA, however, expressly prevents courts from looking to interna-
tional law for help, provided they interpret that law consistently with the congres-
sional intent behind the Act.295
Judicial dissatisfaction with the Act's formulation of "commercial activity"
290. For a discussion of Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 E2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), see supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
291. United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 461 F. Supp. 609, 612 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (citing von Mehren, supra note 8, at 48-54).
292. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
293. Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 438.
294. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 E2d 300, 310 (2d Cir.
1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1602 as originally proposed in 1973 provided in part:
Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts in so far
as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied
upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their commer-
cial activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by United
States courts in conformity with these principles as set forth in this chapter and other
principles of international law.
Proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1602 in S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 2213 (1973) (emphasis
added); S. 711, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 3433 (1973); H.R. 3493, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
119 CONG. REC. 2880 (1973). The italicized language was deleted in the final version of the Act,
causing confusion over the role of international law in questions of foreign sovereign immunity before
United States courts. See generally Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 451-53.
The House Report seems to more fully endorse the use of international law, but it too fails to
indicate to what extent these legal principles should be adopted:
Section 1602 sets forth the central premise of the bill: That decisions on claims by foreign
states to sovereign immunity are best made by the judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime
which incorporates standards recognized under international law.
Although the general concept of sovereign immunity appears to be recognized in interna-
tional law, its specific content and application have generally been left to the courts of
individual nations. There is, however, a wide acceptance of the so-called restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity....
HOUSE REPORT at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note I, at 6613.
295. See generally HousE REPORT, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra
note 1, at 6604-35. See supra notes 17-33 and accompanying text.
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was expressed in Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria.296 In that case, Judge Kaufman intimated his dissatisfaction by stating
that the court must look for principles for determining immunity claims in a
"vaguely-worded statute, . . . a law described by its draftsmen as providing only
'very modest guidance' on issues of pre-eminent importance. "297 He further
contended that "the determination of whether particular behavior is 'commercial'
is perhaps the most important decision a court faces in an FSIA suit" and
observed that "[u]nfortunately the definition of 'commercial' is one issue on
which the Act provides almost no guidance at all. ' 298 The court was able to
dispose of this case because it primarily concerned an application of the "nature"
test299 and because sufficient precedent existed, both in the United States3°° and
abroad0 1 characterizing this very program of purchases by Nigeria as "commer-
296. 647 F2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). In 1975, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria contracted
to buy cement from 109 suppliers all over the world. Four of these suppliers were American corpora-
tions. Under the terms of these four contracts, the cement was to be shipped to Nigeria by the sellers
and payment was to be made through an irrevocable letter of credit deposited with Morgan Bank,
Central Bank of Nigeria's correspondent bank in the United States. In the summer of 1975, Nigeria,
finding it had ordered too much cement for its port facilities to unload, cabled its suppliers and asked
them to stop sending cement. It then refused to allow Morgan Bank to pay the irrevocable letters of
credit without Central Bank's permission. The suppliers sued for anticipatory breach of the contracts
and letters. Nigeria and the Central Bank did not dispute these claims. Instead, they asserted a
defense of sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Id. at 304-07. The court found the contracts to be
commercial in nature, id. at 310, with sufficient nexus to the United States, id. at 313, and thus denied
the claim of sovereign immunity, id. at 316.
297. Id. at 302. Another court described the FSIA as a "'remarkably obtuse' document, a
,statutory labyrinth that, owing to the numerous interpretive questions engendered by its bizarre
structure and its many deliberately vague provisions, has during its brief lifetime been a financial
boon for the private bar but a constant bane for the federal judiciary."' Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A.,
764 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 E Supp. 1094,
1105, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
298. Texas Trading, 647 F2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit agreed with this view when
it noted that "[a]lthough ascertaining the commercial or sovereign nature of a given activity is usually
the crtitical question in a sovereign immunity case, the FSIA provides distressingly little guidance."
de Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 E2d 1385, 1392 (5th Cir. 1985).
299. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir.
1981). Nigeria in this case was apparently trying to come under the test in Victory Transport by
demonstrating that the purpose of its cement purchases was to build roads and army barracks and
therefore contended that immunity should be extended. The court, however, declared that the pur-
ported purpose of the transaction was irrelevant and that Nigeria should be subject to "all the rules of
the marketplace."
300. See National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
301. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 310 n.29 (citing Hispano Americana Mercantil S.A. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, [1979] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 277 (United Kingdom)); lpitrade International, S.A. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria (Int'l Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Award, April 25, 1978),
enforced, 465 F Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978); Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977]
2 W.L.R. 356, 1 All E.R. 881 (United Kingdom); Nonresident Petitioner v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 501 (1977) (published by AM. Soc'v INT'L L.) (Dist. Ct., Frankfurt/
Main, Aug. 25, 1976) (West Germany).
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cial." Given the ease with which the court was able to decide the case, it is
significant that the court, nonetheless, expressed concern over the lack of guid-
ance for determining "commercial activities" under the FSIA.302
While many cases are relatively easy to resolve, a great many fact situations
invite differing conclusions from various courts depending on just how those
facts are interpreted.03 For example, a contract to work on documentary films for
cultural exchange with a foreign government was found to be a political act,
3°4
while a contract to provide artists for musical performances in the United States
between the State Concert Society of the Soviet Union and an American im-
presario was viewed as commercial. °5 Both courts3°6 and legal scholars3 °7 have
split over whether an expropriation in breach of a concession contract is a sov-
ereign act (immune), or a simple breach of contract (not immune). Courts have
even divided in their determinations of whether antitrust violations planned as
part of national economic policies are commercial3°0 or sovereign acts.3°9 These
cases illustrate the wide parameters within which arguments can be framed, and
the uncertainty of results obtained.
B. Problems of the Public Nature of Commercial Activities in Non-
Market Economies
By focusing on the nature, rather than the purpose, of the activity to determine
the commercial nature of the conduct in question, Congress hoped to restrict the
302. Practical Definition, supra note 288, at 302.
303. See Dellapenna, supra note 266, at 232.
304. Gittler v. German Information Center, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600, 95 Misc.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
305. United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 461 F Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). This case also explicitly disavows any attempt to create a third possible category-artistic
endeavors. Id. at 611.
306. Expropriation as a sovereign act: Cary v. National Oil Corp., 453 F Supp. 1097, 1102
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd on other grounds, 592 F2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979); United Mexican States v.
Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. 1977). Expropriation as a commercial act: First Bank of Boston
(International) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 61 Civ. 2116-CLB (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1980). Cf. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,695-706 (1976) (four justices holding an
expropriation to be an act of state, but repudiation of certain contracts under it as commercial acts).
307. Compare Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 241-43 (expropriation is always a sovereign act),
with von Mehren, supra note 8, at 57-8 (expropriation in breach of a concession is a breach of a
contract and, therefore, a commercial act).
308. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F Supp. 384, 394-96 (D.Del. 1978) (A Polish state-
owned golf cart manufacturer was found to have engaged in commercial activities and therefore could
not avail itself of the defense of sovereign immunity in a suit against it for antitrust violations,
although the court did, in effect, apply the act of state doctrine to shield defendant from liability for
governmentally mandated acts. Id. at 396-400).
309. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 477 F Supp. 553, 564-70 (C.D. Cal. 1979). (The district court found that the
activities of the defendant sovereigns in controlling the production and price of oil were not commer-
cial and that sovereign immunity therefore applied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals implicitly
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opportunities for successful invocation of the sovereign immunity defense by
non-market economies, where all trading activities might be considered to be
imbued with a public purpose.310 Yet, it is precisely when the commercial activity
exception is applied to non-market economies that its inadequacies become most
pronounced.31' The FSIA presupposes an ability to distinguish commercial from
non-commercial acts by their nature, rather than by their purpose."2 This distinc-
tion breaks down, however, where an ideological premise exists that all acts have
a public non-profit purpose. That purpose surrounds the act and transforms it
from a formally commercial act to an act in the service of the state.33 As with the
concepts employed by the FSIA to define an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state,"31 4 a test based on the nature of the activity is consistent with a free
market society, but not with a non-market one.3"' Many of the activities that are
strictly private in free market economies are carried out solely by the govern-
ment, or by entities which are neither public nor private, in non-market econo-
mies.316 Thus, what may be considered private in nature by the law of a free
market country is public in nature under the law of a non-market state. Although
the court in Edlow never reached the commercial activities issue,3 17 the Novosti
decision provides a prime example of the problems associated with this definition
in a non-market situation.
Once the court determined that Novosti qualified as an "agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state" for immunity purposes,3t5 it sought to determine whether
Novosti's activities were "in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state.' ' 319 The court acknowledged that Novosti's sales to foreign media con-
stituted commercial activity.320 The critical issue, however, was whether the
reversed the finding that these were not commercial activities, but affirmed on other grounds. 649
E2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)).
310. See Judicial Control, supra note 19, at 438; Capitalist Paradigm, supra note I1, at 436; supra
notes 21, 263 and accompanying text; infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Fenster-
wald, supra note 103, at 620-22; Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-
Deception, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 109 (1961).
311. See generally Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11; Legal Entities, supra note 101; Recent
Developments, supra note I; Property Ownership, supra note I1; Singer, supra note 18; Kahale &
Vega, supra note 19, at 226.
312. See supra notes 269-74, 282-86 and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., infra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 181-92 and accompanying text.
315. See Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 450.
316. See supra notes 21, 90-114, 122-41 and accompanying text.
317. The court found that NEK was not an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," and thus
never considered whether it was engaged in commercial activity. Edlow International Co. v.
Nuklearua Elektrarna Krsko, 441 E Supp. 827, 832 (D.D.C. 1977). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 173-79.
318. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
319. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 E Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
320. Id. at 856.
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alleged libels were "in connection with a commercial activity."32' Because the
Soviet papers in which the articles appeared were published by official organs of
the U.S.S.R., the court characterized Novosti's collaboration as "acts of intra-
governmental cooperation" rather than as commercial activities.3 22 Holding the
statements to be "official commentary of the Soviet government," the court
refused to "reach around the various organs of the Soviet government which
actually published the alleged libels" and subject the Novosti Press Agency to its
jurisdiction.
323
This conclusion is highly suspect. The business of publication, including sales
and distribution, can easily be considered commercial in nature.324 The court in
Novosti, however, seemed to be examining the purpose of the publication when it
noted that it was intra-governmental and in the service of the state.3 25 The result of
the court's interpretation may be a test upon which Socialist business enterprises
can easily establish their public "nature" and corresponding immunity. Soviet
ownership and service to the state is descriptive of all agencies and organizations
in the U.S.S.R.326 Under the Novosti test, the defendant work organization in
Edlow could easily have qualified as an agency if that would have been to its
advantage.3 27 The Novosti decision, in its interpretation of the 1976 Act, may
unwittingly give an advantage to non-market economies.




324. Certainly the dissemination of information is for the public good in terms of freedom of
speech and thought. The court cited the Soviet Constitution and the fact that the press is the servant of
the people. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 E Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
325. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note II, at 448. Obviously, the publication and distribution of
periodicals is a business enterprise. The fact that it is not for private "profits" should not alter the
commercial nature of such activity, or every enterprise in socialist nations could claim immunity on
that basis. The act is certainly one that could be engaged in by a private person. Novosti, 443 F Supp.
at 856. A more recent case under the 1976 Act, United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 461 F Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), refused to grant immunity to the Soviet State Concert
Society on the basis of its artistic and governmental character. A contract under which the U.S.S.R.
would send artists to the U.S. and Great Britain was breached by the U.S.S.R., and the plaintiff sued
under the commercial activities exception to the 1976 Act. Id. at 610. The Court ignored the
unprofitable character and diplomatic purpose of the contract, and deemed the nature of the transac-
tion to be a "sale of a service." Id. at 611. The court therefore denied immunity. Id. at 613. When
contrasted with the Novosti case, this rationale appears more attentive to the intentions of the 1976
Act. The fact that the commercial act was a typical breach of contract made the determination easier
in light of the 1976 Act. But as previously noted, the fact that a contract was involved has not always
been dispositive. See supra notes 40, 304-07 and accompanying text; infra notes 328-41 and
accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 21, 73, 90-114 and accompanying text.
327. Capitalist Paradigm, supra note 11, at 448. The work organization's property was held in trust
for all the people, and certainly its production of electrical power for the people was public in purpose
and even in nature under the simplistic Novosti test.
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effective, courts continue to have difficulty applying the commercial activity
exception. In MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh,328 the Bangladesh
Ministry of Agriculture granted the plaintiff, an Oregon corporation, a ten-year
license to capture and export rhesus monkeys. The agreement specified quan-
tities, prices, and other terms, and required that the plaintiff build a breeding
farm in Bangledesh. The license was conditioned upon exclusive use of the
monkeys for medical and other scientific research. Bangladesh terminated the
agreement two years after its inception because the plaintiff had not yet con-
structed the breeding farm and because the plaintiff allegedly sold monkeys to the
armed services for "neutron bomb radiation experiments.329 MOL, in turn, sued
the Bangladesh government for termination of the agreement. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that:
Bangladesh was terminating an agreement that only a sovereign could have made.
This was not just a contract for trade of monkeys. It concerned Bangladesh's right to
regulate imports and exports, a sovereign prerogative .... It concerned
Bangladesh's right to regulate its natural resources, also a uniquely sovereign
function .... A private party could not have made such an agreement.
330
The court thus held that revocation of the licensing agreement was a sovereign
act and that Bangladesh was immune from suit."'
As one of the drafters of the FSIA noted, "this decision appears to flout the
intent of Congress.'332 Private parties cannot regulate a country's natural re-
sources, but they can enter into contracts to purchase and sell goods. The licens-
ing agreement was nothing more than a contract. What was really at issue in the
case was the breach of that contract by the Bangladesh government. This license
is not unlike a contract by a government to purchase equipment for its army.
Although an individual could not enter such a contract, the House Report ex-
plicitly recognizes that the foreign state is not entitled to immunity for such a
purchase.333 The fact that a contract may have a public purpose is irrelevant under
the 1976 Act. A contract is commercial in nature and thus a foreign state is not
entitled to immunity in its contractual dealings with foreign entities.334 "If this
decision were followed, there would be no security of contract with foreign
governments for the purchase of oil, metals or other primary commodities.
335
328. 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1984).
329. Id. at 1327-28.
330. Id. at 1329.
331. Id.
332. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States Courts 1976-1986, 19 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 31 (1986) [hereinafter Feldman I1].
333. House REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, supra note 1, at
6615. See also supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
334. See HoUsE REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note
1, at 6615; Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F Supp 1393, 1400 (S.D.Fla. 1986) (A contract
is inherently commercial, even when the ultimate purpose behind it is governmental regulation.). See
also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
335. Feldman 11, supra note 332, at 32.
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This could severely impair foreign trade. Yet, the court in Liberian Eastern
Timber Corp. v. Government of the Republic of Liberia,336 relied on MOL when it
found that Liberia's granting of a concession contract to Liberian Eastern Timber
to harvest and exploit Liberian timber and Liberia's subsequent revocation of that
concession were regulations of Liberia's natural resources and sovereign acts.
Both the MOL and the Liberian Eastern Timber courts made the mistake of
looking to the purpose of the activity-the regulation of natural resources-
rather than to its nature-commercial contract. One of the FSIA's drafters con-
ceded that:
[T]he draftsmen [of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976] may have
erred in relying on such vague formulations as the "nature" and "purpose" of a
transaction to guide courts, which too often may be intimidated by the perceived
sensitivities of foreign governments. The MOL court simply denied that it was
looking at the "purpose" of the agreement. It said "consideration of the special
elements of export license and natural resources look only to the nature of the
agreem ent. . . . "37
In de Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,338 the Fifth Circuit actually
admitted that it looked to the purpose of Banco Central's activity in holding that
the Nicaraguan bank was entitled to immunity for its refusal to honor a check
issued in exchange for a certificate of deposit.339 The court observed that an
absolute separation between the nature and the purpose of an act is not always
possible.314 It went on to conclude that "[w]here a government enters into a
contract in its sovereign capacity, then the breach of that contract partakes of the
contract's initial sovereignty."'3 4' As contracts are commercial in nature, re-
gardless of their purpose, the court's ruling contravenes 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d)'s
nature test.
MOL, Liberian Eastern Timber, and de Sanchez indicate that the commercial
activity exception remains a source of confusion for the courts. Moreover, this
confusion is not limited to cases involving non-market economies, such as the
Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, but extends to third world nations as well.
C. Courts Need Guidelines to Achieve Consistent Results
Although the FSIA was intended to introduce uniformity into the process of
making sovereign immunity determinations,342 Congress, rather than provide
336. 650 F Supp. 73, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
337. Feldman II, supra note 332, at 32 (quoting MOL, Inc. v. The People's Republic of
Bangladesh, 736 F2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis in original).
338. 770 F2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
339. Id. at 1387, 1393, 1395.
340. Id. at 1393.
341. Id. at 1394.
342. See HOUSE REPORT at 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note
1, at 6605-06. See also supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
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explicit direction as to commercial activities, paradoxically put its faith in the
courts to develop standards on a case-by-case basis.3 43 Under the Act the courts
have been given such wide latitude and so few guidelines as to what constitutes
commercial activity344 that ultimately immunity determinations are as unpredict-
able as they were when made by the State Department.345 How a court dis-
tinguishes public from private acts depends upon its particular view as to the
appropriate economic and political roles of the state. Different courts draw differ-
ent, and sometimes inconsistent, lines dividing public from private acts.346 Con-
sequently no ascertainable standard capable of functioning as a rule of law of
general application is produced.347 It is simply not possible to build the restrictive
doctrine of sovereign immunity out of judicial practice based upon broad for-
mulations of the distinction between public and private acts.3 48 Rather it is desir-
able, even necessary, to provide guidance to the judiciary through a set of
standards incorporating a predetermined view as to the appropriate role of the
state and representing a reasonable accommodation of conflicting perspectives.
349
D. United Kingdom's State Immunity Act and Victory Transport Case
Suggest Better Approaches
One possible solution to the present ambiguities of the FSIA would be to adopt
the approach taken in the United Kingdom's State Immunity Act of 1978.350 The
SIA parallels the FSIA, codifing the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by
conferring a general grant of immunity upon foreign states.35' This immunity is
then subject to exceptions in cases where there is a waiver352 or the proceedings
are of a commercial, industrial, financial, professional, or contractual nature.
353
In contrast to the FSIA, however, the SIA lists and classifies all acts deemed to be
commercial.35 4 In addition, it specifically precludes immunity in a variety of
343. See Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F2d 300, 308-09
(2d Cir. 1981); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 764 E2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally supra
notes 285-87, 297-98 and accompanying text.
344. See Hill, supra note 18, at 204-05; supra text accompanying notes 280-87. See also HOUSE
REPORT at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, supra note 1, at 6615.
345. See Practical Definition, supra note 288, at 301; supra notes 288-309 and accompanying
text. See also supra notes 318-41.
346. See Singer, supra note 18, at 2; supra notes 303-09, 318-41 and accompanying text.
347. Singer, supra note 18, at 3.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. State Immunity Act 1978, reprinted in 17 Irrr'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 222, at 1123.
351. "A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as
provided in the following provisions of this Act." State Immunity Act 1978, § 1(1), reprinted in 17
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 222, at 1124.
352. State Immunity Act, § 2, reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 222, at 1124.
353. Id., § 3(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 222, at 1124.
354. The SIA defines "commercial transaction" as:
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other circumstances including employment contracts, property damage or per-
sonal injury, British real estate transactions, estate and trust disputes, and patent
and trademark cases.
355
This approach would make immunity decisions more consistent and predict-
able by providing the courts with a detailed list of litigable areas. It fails,
however, to squarely confront the problem of managing two antithetical legal
systems. Regardless of the number of listed exceptions to immunity, it is always
possible to interpret the activity as primarily governmental and therefore unfit for
such private legal categories.35 6 The problem is not due simply to the difficulty of
predicting all the possible future situations in which immunity should be denied
and classifying them in advance.357 The problem is, in fact, much more funda-
mental: Congress seems shackled to Western or free market conceptions of
commercial or governmental purposes and natures when setting the standards for
immune activity.358 Yet classifications based on the nature and purpose of ac-
tivities break down in non-market systems, such as the U.S.S.R. and
Yugoslavia, where perhaps no commercial activity can be truly non-governmen-
tal and every act of a commercial nature has a constitutionally public purpose.3" 9
A better approach to correcting the problems inherent in the current formula-
tion of the FSIA is a return to a formulation similar to that advanced in Victory
Transport.36° The Act proclaims sovereign immunity to be the general rule and
non-immunity to be the exception.6 ' It thus reverses the approach taken in
Victory Transport, where the court stated: "[W]e are disposed to deny a claim of
sovereign immunity. . . unless it is plain that the activity in question falls within
one of the categories of strictly political or public acts about which sovereigns
have traditionally been quite sensitive."3 62 One commentator contends that the
drafters of the Act have not advanced a satisfactory reason for this reversal, and
that there appears to be none.3 63 A comprehensive rule of non-immunity should
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indem-
nity in respect of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, profes-
sional or other similar character) into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise
than in the exercise of sovereign authority.
Id. "Commercial transaction" does not include an employment contract between a state and an
individual. Id.
355. Id., §§ 4-11, at 1124-26.




360. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965). See also supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
361. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. See also supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
362. Victory Transport, 336 F2d at 360. See also von Mehren, supra note 8, at 53.
363. Smit, supra note 29, at 64 n.85.
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be prescribed.64 Only if a state's activity falls within an expressly enumerated
category of sovereign authority should immunity attach.
Although this formulation may seem to be a radical departure from the ap-
proach presently followed, it is probably not contrary to any generally accepted
principle of international law or to any uniform state practice in the matter.
3 65
International law prescribes a restrictive view of foreign sovereign immunity.
66
Such a view can be carried into practice as a general grant of immunity with
broad exceptions of non-immunity, or as a general denial of immunity with
narrow exceptions of immunity. The latter formulation may actually be preferable
because under international law a state is absolutely sovereign within its own
territory.367 Sovereign immunity is a derogation from the normal rule of territorial
sovereignty. It is thus sovereign immunity which is the exception to jurisdiction
and not jurisdiction which is the exception to a basic rule of immunity.368 Sov-
ereign immunity should therefore be granted only when international law re-
quires-that is to say, only when the sovereignty of the foreign state is in
question.369 It should not be granted when the state acts as a private individual or
has entered into a transaction which does not involve its political or governmental
powers. 370
E. Most Ancient Immunity Justifications Obsolete in Modern World
Due to increasing government involvement in the marketplace and the
emergence of the restrictive doctrine,37' the concepts which formerly justified
immunity, such as the equality and independence of states and the dignity of
sovereigns,372 are no longer valid. 373 The equality of nations now requires that
states that choose to enter the marketplace in their own name not be unilaterally
364. For similar suggestions, see Smit, supra note 29, at 63; Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 222,
226, 227.
365. Singer, supra note 18, at 20 n.74; Lauterpact, supra note 18, at 226. See also Hill, supra note
18, at 183; Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT'L L.
REV. 265, 270-71 (1982).
366. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
367. See Hill, supra note 18, at 183.
368. Higgins, supra note 365, at 271. See also Fensterwald, supra note 103, at 621.
369. See Hill, supra note 18, at 183. In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Justice Marshall recognized
that the basic principle is not the immunity of the foreign state but the full jurisdiction of the territorial
state. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812). He felt that
because immunity is a derogation of that jurisdiction, any immunity accorded to a foreign state must
be traced to the territorial state's waiver of its jurisdiction. Id. According to Marshall, since the host
state extends immunity to the foreign state voluntarily, it can withdraw immunity and reassert its
jurisdiction at any time. Moreover, immunity may be extended upon such conditions as the host sees
fit to impose, which gives it the right to enact laws such as the FSIA. Id.
370. Fensterwald, supra note 103, at 621.
371. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
373. Higgins, supra note 365, at 271.
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entitled to extended immunities that other states that leave trade to the commer-
cial sector do not claim. 374 Similarly the independence of nations is now regarded
as consistent with granting immunity in some cases and withholding it in others
to prevent the independence of the trading state from being exalted at the expense
of the independence of its neighbors.37 Even the concept of the dignity of the
sovereign has altered. International law no longer regards it as contrary to the
dignity of nations to adjudicate claims against hem.376 On the contrary:
It is more in keeping with the dignity of the foreign sovereign to submit himself to
the rule of law than to claim to be above it, and his independence is better ensured
by accepting the decision of courts of acknowledged impartiality, than by arbitrarily
rejecting their jurisdiction. In all civilised countries there has been a progressive
tendency towards making the sovereign liable to be sued in his own courts ...
Foreign sovereigns should not be in any different position.
377
These changes reflect the evolution of international law from a system that
provided direct benefits only for states, to one increasingly concerned with
providing appropriate protection for individuals.3 78 The function of the restrictive
doctrine is to prevent the acts of private litigants from interfering with the sov-
ereign functions of states while allowing rights and remedies arising out of
trading transactions to be adjudicated on their merits according to the rules of the
market.
379
Most scholars agree that there remains a core area of sovereign activity, prin-
cipally the conduct of governmental activities pertaining to national defense,
diplomacy and administration, entitled to immunity from jurisdiction of other
states as a matter of international law.30 Beyond that, the distinction between
immune and non-immune transactions is drawn by municipal, rather than by




377. Rahimtoola v. Nizam, 1958 A.C. 379, 418.
378. Higgins, supra note 365, at 271.
379. Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965). See generally Hill, supra note 18, at 181-82, 204-05; Crawford, International
Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions, 54 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 75, 83
(1983); Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 237-39; Lowenfeld, supra note 40, at 929.
380. Feldman, supra note 4, at 302; Crawford, supra note 379, at 78.
381. Feldman, supra note 4, at 302; Crawford, supra note 379, at 78. According to Lowenfeld,
supra note 40, at 931, the writers in the area all say substantially the following:
Foreign sovereigns and the governments of foreign States enjoy immunity from the jurisdic-
tion of municipal courts. However, the extent of the immunity actually accorded them varies
greatly, and the most that can be said of customary international law is that it enjoins
immunity from the judicial process only in respect of governmental activities that pertain to
administration, and does not compel it in respect of other activities which are more truly
commercial than administrative.
Id. (quoting D. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 913.)
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The restrictive theory of immunity, therefore, does not require that the interests
of private litigants be sacrificed to the interests of the state in other than these
limited categories. 382 Rather the interests of the state must be balanced against the
interests of the individual. In all instances where the sovereign function of the
state is not at issue, the interests of the individual should prevail.
F. Proposed Amendment o FSIA §§ 1604 and 1605 Definition of Immune
Sovereign Authority
In conformity with internationally recognized areas of immune conduct, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1604 and 1605 of the FSIA should be amended to read as follows:383
(a) Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act (as amended) a foreign
state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States and of the states except for actions arising out of the exercise of its
sovereign authority as detailed in parts (b) and (c) of this section.
(b) The sovereign authority of a foreign state extends only to-
(1) legislative acts and measures taken in pursuance thereof, such as
nationalization,
(2) executive and administrative acts within territory of the foreign
state, such as expulsion of an alien or conferment of nationality on
persons sufficiently connected with the state,
(3) disposition of armed forces within the jurisdiction of the foreign
state, and
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity.
(c) The sovereign authority of a foreign state does not extend to-
(1) any arrangement (contract or otherwise) for the supply of goods
or services,
382. See Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 227, 237-39; Victory ransport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General, 336 F2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
383. In addition to restricting immunity to certain well defined categories of sovereign activity, the
FSIA should include a provision under which a foreign state may waive its right to immunity even in
these areas. The waiver exception to immunity presently in the FSIA, however, is extremely vague as
to what kind of conduct constitutes a waiver. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). This provision should be
redrafted to conform more closely to that in the International Law Association Draft Convention on
Sovereign Immunity (ILADC). See generally Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity, art.
III, § A, reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 287, 288-89 (1983) (published by AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L.). Like the FSIA, the ILADC provides that the foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction
"[w]here the foreign state has waived its immunity from the jurisdiction of the forum state either
expressly or by implication." td. at 288. Unlike the FSIA, however, it goes on to give examples of
what constitutes express or implied waivers. Id. at 288-89. This combination of a general rule
followed by specific instances which constitute express and implied waivers provides courts with the
guidance for making waiver determinations that is sorely lacking in the current FSIA formulation.
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(2) any financial transaction involving lending or borrowing or
guaranteeing financial obligations, or
(3) any other transaction or activity (whether commercial, indus-
trial, financial, professional or other similar character) into which a state
enters or in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign
authority as specified in part (b) of this section.3
The importance of the activities shielded by these categories requires that they
be granted immunity. For example, a government could not function smoothly
and effectively if its internal administrative acts were constantly threatened by
judicial inquiry at the instigation of private citizens.3 85 Similarly, a government's
foreign diplomacy would be substantially hampered if it were made a potential
subject of litigation in foreign courts.386 The government's interest in freedom
from suit outweighs the private litigant's interest in access to the courts in cases
involving such actions.3 7 In all other cases, the individual's interest in court
adjudication of a private claim outweighs the state's interest in avoiding such
litigation.38
Subsection (c) is an adaptation of the United Kingdom's State Immunity Act of
384. In addition to the proposed amendment, which relates to subject matter jurisdiction for
actions involving foreign sovereigns in United States courts, the FSIA must contain a provision
detailing the personal jurisdiction of the courts-the nexus required between the act in question and
the United States. This nexus is presently provided in the commercial activity exception itself, which
states that a foreign sovereign shall not be immune in any case:
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). This provision, along with 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), see supra note 31, has been
criticized for combining (or confusing) notions of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. To make
the nexus requirement clear, the FSIA should contain a separate provision detailing the necessary
contacts with the forum. Such a provision is beyond the scope of this note. For a discussion of the
nexus requirement and an analysis of the present provisions, see Hill, supra note 18, at 212-28; Note,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activities
Exception: Vencedora Oceanica Navegacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Naviga-
tion, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125 (1986); Comment, Establishing Jurisdiction Under the Commercial-
Activities Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 19 Hous. L. REV. 1003 (1982);
Developments, Comprehensive Guidelines For the Commercial Activities Exception of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, II DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 123 (1981).
385. Hill, supra note 18, at 182.
386. Id.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 368-70, 377-80.
388. Hill, supra note 18, at 171-73, 181-183. See also supra notes 368-70, 377-83 and accom-
panying text.
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1978's definition of commercial activity. 389 Although the transactions to which it
relates are excluded from the four categories of immune behavior, it is included in
the amendment to emphasize that such activity is not entitled to immunity.
Such a formulation of the immunity doctrine is clear and easily applied. It
permits courts to reach consistent conclusions without excessive inquiry into the
affairs of a defendant state. Additionally, the detailed description of categories of
immunity allows both private persons and foreign states to predict with reason-
able certainty whether a claim of immunity is likely to be sustained.39° Moreover,
it avoids the problem of trying to anticipate all of the possible situations in which
immunity should not be granted: non-immunity is the rule, rather than the
exception.
Casting the doctrine in the negative emphasizes the notion that extending
immunity is not a preferred practice. Rather it is an exception to normal jurisdic-
tion and should not be encouraged. This recognizes that in most cases the
interests of the private litigant are paramount to those of the government.3 9
Most important, however, this formulation avoids the use of Western or free
market conceptions of commercial purposes and natures. By basing immunity on
international legal requirements, it immunizes only those activities traditionally
protected by sovereigns.3 92 While an act of a commercial nature in a non-market
system may be performed by the government and/or have a constitutionally
public purpose, it is not necessarily a sovereign function. Governments may
freely put aside the sovereign mantle and become involved in non-sovereign
activities. The government is welcome to enter the marketplace. If it chooses to
do so, however, it must do so under the terms of the market. As discussed in
Section II of this Note, those terms include a restrictive view of sovereign
immunity. Both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China appear to have
recognized this in recent years.393 Therefore, this proposal should not upset the
political sensibilities of any major international traders.
VI. CONCLUSION
A society's political and economic ideology shapes the meaning of legal terms
in a transaction. That ideology cannot be disregarded when evaluating the activity
of a state. The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, despite its intended
purpose of facilitating immunity determinations, is inadequate when applied to
non-market economies because it ignores the ideological differences between
East and West. As contacts between United States citizens and foreign entities
389. State Immunity Act 1978, § 3(3), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 222, at
1124.
390. See generally Hill, supra note 18, at 182 (Advantages of system created in Victory Transport).
391. See generally id.
392. See Kahale & Vega, supra note 19, at 245.
393. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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continue to increase, these deficiencies will become more acute. It is thus imper-
ative that Congress provide the courts with more appropriate guidance in immu-
nity determinations.
The problems inherent in the present version of the Act can be avoided by
eliminating the capitalist notions embedded in the Act's draftsmanship and ap-
pealing to the international legal doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity.
Congress, therefore, should amend the 1976 Act to provide a more detailed
definition of a foreign state, a definition that avoids Western concepts of
ownership by appealing to foreign law in classifying the entity involved. Addi-
tional complications can be avoided by making non-immunity the rule, rather
than the exception, and extending immunity only in select circumstances. Such
an amendment would go a long way toward eliminating the capitalist concepts
presently in the FSIA, thus making the Act applicable to market and non-market
economies alike.
